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ABSTRACT 




Advisor: Thomas Kucharski, Ph.D. 
 
Delusional disorder has long been recognized in the psychiatric nomenclature, however, 
low prevalence rates and prevailing clinical views about the seemingly refractory nature 
of delusional disorder have restricted data on clinical treatment outcomes for this illness. 
Similar perspectives have been noted in forensic settings where minimal data is available 
to guide standards of care for incompetent to stand trial (IST) delusional pretrial 
defendants. Rationale. While the factors explicated in Sell provide guidelines for the 
involuntary medication of defendants found IST, numerous questions are left unanswered 
regarding the restorability of pretrial delusional detainees. The proposed study 
investigated the competency restoration rates of defendants with delusional symptoms 
and, more broadly, using the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) assessed how these 
symptoms impact competency related abilities. Method. Data were gathered from 
competency restoration reports at a federal medical center. A total of 232 cases were 
drawn with replacement from a five year span, and then coded for demographic, clinical, 
and psycholegal variables. Results. Nearly 60% of defendants suffered with one or more 




delusions, and the delusional ideation for those who met the BPRS threshold for a 
delusional disorder (DD) classification was more pervasive than for those in either the 
schizophrenia or mood with psychosis subgroups. Defendants in the DD subgroup were 
also more likely to refuse treatment. The logistic regression model showed adequate 
overall classification (63.4%)  and one static variable, i.e., prior psychiatric treatment, 
reached statistical significance; indicating that those with such a history were less likely 
to be restored. Discussion. The high rates of treatment refusal for DD defendants meant 
that most of these defendants were opined IST after their first statutorily determined 
competency restoration period, however, this group was no less likely to be opined 
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Delusional disorder, previously falling under the broad designation of paranoia, 
has been recognized for centuries (Fennig, Fochtmann, & Bromet, 2005). In the past 
paranoia, derived from ancient Greek para (beside) and nous (mind), was typically used 
as a common reference to madness (and even dementia). Emil Kraepelin (1904/1917) 
considered the concept of paranoia inextricably bound to the development of psychiatry 
as a discipline and, presently, persecutory or paranoid beliefs are recognized as the most 
prevalent theme underpinning the delusions of psychotic patients (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). The presence of nonbizarre delusions with the relative absence of 
other forms of psychopathology is a central feature of delusional disorder. In non-clinical 
populations, rates of delusional ideation have been reported to be between 10-15% while 
another 1-3% of people in the general population evidence delusional beliefs that reach 
clinical significance (Freeman, 2006). As a diagnostic entity delusional disorder has been 
better delineated in the fourth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) and the subsequent DSM-V (APA, 2013). The 
nosological differentiation from schizophrenia and mood disorders has allowed for a slow 
but steady increase in clinical research on this disorder. Still, as Fennig and colleagues 
(2005) indicate the nosological status of delusional disorder has been subject to intense 
debate since the early taxonomic contributions on paranoia by Kraepelin (1904/1917). 
The number of inmates in the United States with major mental illness has steadily 
risen (Lamberti & Weisman, 2004). At the same time mental health concerns in offender 
populations are brought up with some regularity in pre-trial proceedings, especially for 




cases where adjudicative competence is at issue. Nationwide there are close to 60,000 
competency evaluations conducted annually (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000), and the financial 
burden and time associated with adjudicative competence has been well documented 
(Golding, 1992). Most defendants referred for competency restoration are successfully 
treated; consequently the accurate identification of those who respond poorly holds 
significant value (Zapf & Roesch, 2009) within this criminal justice domain.  
Current research indicates that defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST) 
under Dusky v. United States (1960) usually suffer from more severe clinical disorders, 
predominantly psychotic disorders (Otto, 2006). Patients living with delusional disorder 
seldom, if ever, seek treatment voluntarily as they typically deny having a mental illness.  
Additionally, the quality of their psychotic symptoms often does not rise to the point of 
serious functional impairment in their daily lives.  However, their contact with mental 
health professionals is often precipitated by some legal dilemma (Felthous, Stanislaus, 
Hempel, & Gleyzer, 2001), but related treatment outcome data for IST defendants 
diagnosed with delusional disorder is severely limited.  
The literature on the treatment of delusional disorder mostly consists of individual 
case reports of non-randomized studies with small sample sizes. Further, treatment 
guidelines for this condition are typically gleaned from the protocols of other psychotic 
disorders such as schizophrenia where more effort has been expended on studies of 
treatment efficacy (Felthous et al., 2001). Also contributing to the scarcity of data on the 
restorability rates of delusional defendants is the notion, both in the clinical (Manschrek 
& Khan, 2006) and forensic literature (Liokis & Herbert, 2005), that delusional disorder 
is highly stable and resistant to treatment. For example, psychiatric testimony proffered in 




United States v. Ghane (2004) before the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals explained that 
only 10% of these patients experience symptom reduction when treated with 
psychotropic medication, suggesting a very low probability for competency restoration. 
To date the number of studies investigating competency restoration for defendants 
diagnosed with delusional disorder (DD) have been negligible. The current study hopes 
to add to the small body of research on CST restoration, and to expand existing 
knowledge about restoration outcomes for DD defendants. Further, a focus on specific 
symptoms and their role on CST restoration rather than diagnostic categories can 
potentially provide a more nuanced understanding of competency restoration efforts for 
this group of defendants. 
The first part of the literature review provides an overview of the diagnostic 
evolution of DD - from early links to paranoid ideation to current diagnostic 
understanding. A number of scholars have given this subject more comprehensive 
coverage (see for example, Kendler, 1981; Lewis, 2009; Schifferdecker & Peters, 1995). 
The introductory section focuses on the diagnostic underpinnings of delusional disorder, 
and thereafter treatment and outcome data for this psychotic disorder is reviewed, The 
primarily focus in this section is on the treatment of delusional disorder, and concludes 
with an explication of the forensic implications for pretrial incompetent to stand trial 
(IST) defendants diagnosed with this condition.  
 The latter part of the literature review provides an outline of competency to stand 
trial (CST), specifically procedural aspects, and then addresses competency restoration. 
Here the discussion of competency restoration or treatment in the forensic context is 
more extensive than the much broader legal concept of competency. Finally, a review of 




DD within the context of CST restoration is delineated, concluding with the research 
questions relevant for the current study 
 Chapter Three of this study outlines the methodology with the results section 
presented in Chapter Four. The final chapter provides a discussion of the results gleaned 
from the current study. Here the caveats and limitations of the current study are also 
addressed. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the strengths of the study and 






















Delusional disorder: Treatment and Competency Restoration  
Nosological Development of Paranoid Disorders 
Paranoid disorders were a common subject of focus in the psychiatric writings of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century. A notable predecessor to Kraepelin’s classification 
of paranoia was Karl Kahlbaum (1878/2007) whose work illustrated the anomalous 
nature of paranoid ideation across a range of medical conditions. Kahlbaum devoted 
much attention to the prognostic features of mental illness and derived much of his 
understanding from clinical observation. He argued that paranoia was a subgroup of 
partial psychosis with no underlying organic etiology. Prognostically he viewed paranoia 
as a chronic disease characterized by intellectual symptoms that remained constant over 
time (Kahlbaum, 1878/2007). 
A seminal contribution in Kraepelin’s (1904/1917) diagnostic classification 
system of paranoia was his differentiation of this illness from dementia praecox (or 
schizophrenia) and manic-depressive insanity (or bipolar mood disorder). This taxonomy 
not only gave prominence to paranoia within psychiatric annals, but formed the basis for 
the formal introduction of delusional disorder (DD) some seven decades later. Kraepelin 
frequently revised his ideas on paranoia, outlining the complexity of this concept in 
subsequent editions of his textbook. Kraepelin (1904/1917), like Kahlbaum before him, 
formulated his conclusions from observing the natural course of the illness rather than 
etiological factors, which remain relatively obscure even to this day. Kraeplin considered 
paranoia a chronic illness marked by the presence of a fixed delusional system, an 
absence of hallucinations, and a personality left largely intact. Muck like Kahlbaum 




(1878/2007), who identified intellectual symptoms as fundamental to paranoia, Kraepelin 
(1917) wrote, “[I]n this delusionary working-up the considerable weakness of judgment 
(emphasis retained) of the patient becomes very apparent” (p.146). Kraepelin identified 
four delusional subtypes: persecutory, jealous, grandiose, and hypochondriacal and, for 
the most part, delusions have been classified by their content and/or theme ever since. 
Subsequent attempts to better delineate paranoid disorders were made by Karl 
Jaspers (1963), who viewed delusions as “pathologically falsified judgments” (p.95). In 
his clinical observations Jaspers noted that the beliefs of patients with this illness were 
often held with a strong subjective certainty or conviction, were incorrigible, and were 
characterized by a falsity of content. However, Jaspers only provided a guideline for the 
clinical assessment of delusions and duly cautioned, “[simple] definition will not dispose 
of this matter” (Jaspers, 1963, p.93). His overall view of delusions was that they were not 
understandable or incomprehensible and, consequently, not amenable to psychological 
inquiry. Instead, he argued, they were to be viewed phenomenologically (via the 
expression of the patient) and not on the basis of their content.  
Large multisite studies examining the broader construct of delusions have 
reported some plasticity in delusional content over time, and associated persistence of 
delusions with a range of factors. These include older age, a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
and marital status (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Vesselinov, 2004). Still, even today 
observations about the chronicty and seemingly autochthonous nature of delusional 
disorder continue to confound treatment and prognostic outlooks. While the former 
implies a resistance to treatment, the latter alludes to a possible explanation for the 




limited controlled treatment trials for delusional disorder and, why drug studies tend to 
lump delusional disorder together with other psychotic spectrum disorders.  
 
Diagnostic Classification 
Initial diagnostic classifications (e.g., DSM-I, 1952; DSM-II, 1968) did not distinctly 
rule out hallucinations in non-schizophrenic paranoid conditions; however, DSM-III-R 
(1987) saw the formal introduction of the term delusional disorder (DD) and, with that, a 
move away from the less circumscribed paranoid disorder outlined in previous 
classifications(see Table 1). The current diagnostic classification (DSM-V) lists DD 
under the category of psychotic disorders, where the primary distinction from other 
disorders in this category is the presence of a delusion in the relative absence of other 
psychotic features (APA, 2013). Functional impairment, when present, is directly 
attributable to the delusion rather than to other psychotic symptoms. The current DSM-V 
definition of DD essentially retains the Kraepelian conception of the illness; a position 














Historical Overview of the Prognostic Outlook 
Data Source Diagnostic label Comments on prognosis 
Kahlbaum (1878/2007) Paranoia Incurable, may progress to dementia 
Kraepelin (1904/1917) Paranoia Chronic with limited deterioration in 
personality 
Jaspers (1923/1963) Primary delusions Chronic with a concomitant change in 
personality 
DSM I ( 1952) Paranoid reactions  Persistent with intelligence preserved 
DSM II (1968) Paranoid states Minimal differentiation from course of 
schizophrenia 
DSM-III-R (1987)ª Delusional disorder Relatively variable course, ranges from 
chronic to periods of full remission 
without relapse 








Similar to DSM-III-R, better prognosis for 
persecutory type associated with a 
precipitating event 
Disorder generally stable, although some 
patients later develop schizophrenia 
ª Introduces term delusional disorder as a distinct diagnostic entity 
 




A number of conditions need to be ruled out prior to a diagnosis of DD, such as 
schizophrenia (paranoid type), psychotic mood disorder, dementia, drug-induced 
psychotic disorder, hypochondriasis, and paranoid personality disorder.  
Some early scholars, notably Jaspers, eschewed the prevailing content-based 
classification of delusions; but, while he argued for a phenomenological approach 
(Jaspers, 1963), more recent authors have argued for a dimensional characterization of 
delusions (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 1999). For example, empirical data from large 
multisite studies have shown some plasticity (variable intensity) and shifts in delusional 
content over time (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Vesselinov, 2004), pointing to the limitations 
of the current content dominated nosology of delusions. Nevertheless, current 
classification of DD defines delusions as "fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in 
the light of conflicting evidence" (APA, 2013) and subdivides delusions based on their 
content. Historically delusions, hallucinations, thought disorder, disorganized/abnormal 
behavior, and negative symptoms are the domains comprising psychotic illness.  And. 
DD is the only psychotic disorder characterized by a disturbance in only one of the 
aforementioned five domains. The principle subtypes are outlined below based on DSM-
V criteria.  
 Persecutory: The central theme of the delusion is that one (or someone to whom 
one is close) is under attack, being harassed, persecuted, or conspired against. 
 Jealous: A delusion that one's intimate partner is unfaithful. 
 Erotomanic: A delusion where the individual believes another person, usually of 
higher social status, is in love with him/her. 




 Grandiose: The overriding theme of this delusion is one of inflated self-worth, 
power, knowledge, identity, or that one has a special relationship to a deity or 
famous person 
 Somatic: The delusion that one has some physical defect or general medical 
condition. In an effort to distinguish the somatic type from body dysmorphic 
disorder DSM-V is expected to classify this type solely on the delusion that the 
person has some medical condition (APA, 2010).  
 Mixed type: This involves a combination of two or more of the types described 
above. 
The prevailing diagnostic nomenclature defines a delusion as a fixed rather than 
"erroneous" (as in DSM-IV), belief that remains intractable in the face of contradictory 
evidence. In the current DSM nosology a delusion can be nonbizarre (conceivable events 
that can occur in everyday life) or bizarre, which involves phenomenon that others in the 
individual’s culture would regard as completely implausible. The prior emphasis on the 
bizarreness, often a complex, mercurial concept, of a delusion presented special 
challenges—a fact that has not gone unrecognized in the prevailing diagnostic 
nomenclature. Typically, the bizarreness of a delusion is inferred from its cultural and 
objective implausibility, but prior operational definitions have not been satisfactory, and 
a number of researchers have questioned the overall reliability of bizarre delusions 
(Cermolacce, Sass, & Parnas, 2010; Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006). These conceptual 
shortcomings have, to a considerable extent, bolstered the argument against the 
sufficiency of a single bizarre delusion for diagnosing schizophrenia, and contributed to 




some substantive revisions of psychotic spectrum disorders in the most recent diagnostic 
classification.  
 Aside from discarding the DSM-IV subtypes of schizophrenia another notable 
change in DSM-V is that a bizarre delusion no longer precludes a differential diagnosis of 
DD. Presently a solitary bizarre delusion on criterion A is no longer sufficient for a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. As a consequence current conceptualization of DD allows for 
a single bizarre or nonbizarre delusion. DSM-V also allows for severity ratings of 
delusions, although diagnosis can be made independent of severity specifiers. Finally, to 
delineate DD more clearly from obsessive-compulsive disorder and body dysmorphic 
disorder the latter conditions now represent distinct diagnoses (with or without psychotic 
features) as opposed to the dual diagnosis classified in earlier editions.  
Although these subsequent editions of the DSM endeavored to distinguish 
delusional disorder from schizophrenia and mood disorders, delusions remain common to 
the latter two disorders. This is further borne out in cross cultural studies with 
schizophrenia, which show that persecutory ideation is by far the most common content 
in the delusions of schizophrenic patients (Stompe et al., 1999). In terms of mood 
disorders, empirical evidence indicates that a fair number of patients who suffer from 
depression (Manschrek & Khan, 2006) and bipolar mood disorder (Goodwin & Jamison, 
2007) experience persecutory delusions during acute episodes. Specifically, Goodwin and 
Jamison found persecutory ideation to be a feature in 29% of manic episodes. As Munro 
(1988) pointed out more than two decades ago, "the relationship between affective and 
delusional disorders is a complex one, but there is no doubt that a relationship exists" 
(p.176).  




Additional evidence for this connection is found in pharmacotherapy reviews that 
show some effectiveness for antidepressants in combination with antipsychotics when 
treating delusional disorder (Manschrek & Khan, 2006). Taken together, the 
aforementioned findings suggest that the present day clinical picture and treatment of 
delusional disorder continues to reflect its shared nosological roots with schizophrenia 
and mood disorders. 
 Epidemiology. Existing data suggests 10-15% of non-clinical samples report 
delusional ideation, while an estimated 1-3% of people in the general population report 
delusional beliefs that reach clinical significance (Freeman, 2006). The prevalence rate 
(0.02%) for DD is low, with a lifetime morbidity risk of 0.05% to 0.1% (APA, 2013) and 
patients in this diagnostic category seldom seek treatment voluntarily. However, with the 
recent changes (the inclusion of a single bizarre delusion) to diagnostic classification 
mental health professionals will no doubt see an increase in prevalence rates for DD. 
 
Treatment of Delusional Disorder 
 Differences in treatment response time for psychotic symptoms contributes to the 
clinical lore that DD is difficult to treat. For example, Gunduz-Bruce et al. (2005) 
reported significantly longer treatment response times (in days) for delusions (median = 
76, M = 150, SD = 239) compared to hallucinations (median = 27, M = 59, SD = 104) for 
a sample (N = 118) suffering first episode schizophrenia.  
 Psychological Treatment. A review of the extant literature suggests that treatment 
outcomes for DD are variable. Evidence for this conclusion was found in the MacArthur 
Violence Risk Assessment Study by Appelbaum et al., (2004), which simultaneously 




underscored both the chronicity and change in delusions over time.  Using DSM-III 
diagnostic criteria, Appelbaum et al. (2004) collected baseline and follow-up (five 
interviews) data from more than 1,000 psychiatric patients in this multisite study. Their 
findings suggest marked variability in the content and intensity of delusions over time, 
but they also found that certain factors increased the likelihood of persistent delusions, 
e.g., a baseline diagnosis of schizophrenia.  
To date no structured psychological treatment for DD has been delineated and 
research in the area mainly consists of single case reports or studies with small 
nonrandomized samples yielding mixed results. For example, Chadwick and Lowe 
(1994) reported a reduction in delusional convictions over a six month period for most of 
their sample (N=12) using verbal challenges and reality testing. In contrast, Sharp et al. 
(1996), using the same CBT techniques as the former authors, reported significantly 
lower response rates.  
More broadly, cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT), which has been applied in the 
treatment of schizophrenia, has only recently been used to treat DD (Manschrek & Khan, 
2006), where part of the therapy centers on a collaborative effort between patient and 
therapist to evaluate the facts of the delusional beliefs and to work on mistrust. According 
to O’Connor et al. (2007), current practice in the CBT for delusional disorder comprises 
three stages: preparing the patient for therapy, cognitive challenges of the delusional 
conviction(s), and reality testing to allow for disconfirmation of the false conviction(s).  
More recent data has found weak to moderate main effects on various dimensions 
of the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (MADS) for CBT compared with an 
attention placebo control (APC) (O’Connor et al., 2007). Unfortunately, the sample size 




for this study was rather small thus limiting any clinical conclusions. Current clinical 
practice shows that psychotropic medication remains the first line of treatment for this 
group of psychotic patients1. Still, the moderate success of CBT approaches suggests that 
DD is not impervious to psychological intervention. 
 Pharmacotherapy. The first line of treatment for schizophrenia and other 
psychotic disorders such as DD is antipsychotic (neuroleptic) medication. As with 
psychotherapeutic intervention, drug treatment studies of DD are also limited by 
insufficient scientific data. As Smith and Buckley (2006) note, “there is not a single 
randomized, controlled psycho-pharmacological trial for treating this [delusional 
disorder] illness” (p.351). However, these authors made the point that certain newer 
second generation antipsychotics (SGAs), e.g., olanzapine, aripirazole, and quietiapine, 
may prove effective in the treatment of DD. Further, since no specific class of medication 
is indicated for the treatment of DD, guidelines for treatment are typically gleaned from 
the protocols of other psychotic disorders, such as schizophrenia, where more effort has 
been expended on studies of efficacious treatment (Felthous et al., 2001). Together these 
factors have severely limited any systematic evaluation of the prognostic features of DD. 
 Before the advent of atypical antipsychotics a few clinical studies showed 
efficacy for the orally administered older first generation antipsychotic (FGA) Pimozide 
in the treatment of DD and clinical consensus continues to support its use (O’Connor et 
al., 2007). For example, in a review of 209 clinical case reports, Munro and Mok (1995) 
reported a recovery rate of 68.5% for the 143 patients treated with Pimozide2. The rest of 
                                                 
1 Additionally illustrated in the Supreme Court’s comparison of amicus briefs in Sell v. United State (2003) 
submitted by the American Psychological Association (Amicus Curiae 10-14) and the American 
Psychiatric Association et al. (Amici Curiae 13-22). 
 2 Also see McCoy; Schwarzkopf, and Martin (1992) who cite successful outcomes in a number of cases. 




the patients in their sample were treated with other typical antipsychotics such as 
haloperidol and thioridazine. Further, these authors reported total or partial recovery for 
approximately 80% of cases (Munro & Mok, 1995). Based on these results they 
concluded that DD, contrary to widespread opinions, has treatment outcomes comparable 
to other psychiatric conditions.  
Manschrek and Khan (2006) conducted a follow up on the work of Munro and 
Mok (1995), reviewing published cases from a number of databases over a ten year 
period (1994-2004). They identified a total of 224 cases and from those cases with 
sufficient outcome data (n=134) they reported results consistent with those of Munro and 
Mok (1995). Manschrek and Khan (2006) reported full recovery in nearly half (49.3%) of 
the cases reviewed while 10.4% of the sample showed no improvement. Another notable 
finding, from Manschrek and Khan's (2006) study was the significantly better response 
rates for somatic delusions compared to other subtypes. Most patients in their study had a 
favorable response to treatment regardless of the type of antipsychotic medication 
administered. By extension, their study found no statistically significant difference in 
outcome rates between patients treated with FGAs and SGAs.  
This is an important finding given the drug safety concerns associated with older 
FGAs such as Pimozide. The side effect profile of FGAs has been well documented in the 
extant literature and is notable for movement disorders such as tardive dyskinesia, 
Parkinsonian effects, dystonic reactions, and akathisia. For example, Elmer, George and 
Petersen (2000) cited a number of adverse side effects associated with Pimozide such as 
tardive dyskinesia and, more seriously, cardiac conduction defects (Food and Drug 
Administration, 2002). The subsequent predominance of SGAs in recent years is largely 




attributable to their more circumscribed side effects profiles. Although no less serious the 
adverse effects of these newer drugs include inter alia sedation, hypotension, weight gain, 
and decreases in white blood cell counts.  
What more recent clinical reviews, such as the study conducted by Manschrek 
and Khan (2006), show is that atypical antipsychotic medication or SGAs (e.g., 
Risperidone) may hold some promise in the treatment of DD; above and beyond the 
limited data citing the efficacy of older, typical (FGAs) psychotropic agents. Additional 
data point to the usefulness of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) but to date 
no controlled studies have been conducted to determine the efficacy of these drugs. In 
addition, current drug therapies not only allude to the nosological link between DD and 
other psychotic and mood disorders, but also point to the prevalence of polypharmacy 
(Manschrek & Khan, 2006), often comprising different combinations of antipsychotics 
and antidepressants.  
A notable methodological caveat inherent to all the preceding clinical reviews, 
which Manschrek and Khan (2006) acknowledge, is the reluctance of researchers/ 
clinicians to publish data on failed cases. In addition, these studies rate recovery on a 
continuum, thus relying on clinical judgment rather than on objective outcome measures. 
Notwithstanding these findings, which show some amenability to treatment for DD, the 
long held notion that this psychotic disorder is highly stable and resistant to treatment 
persists within both clinical (Manschrek & Khan, 2006) and forensic mental health 
settings (Liokis & Herbert, 2005). 
 The pronounced lack of insight inherent to DD drives these patients' characteristic 
opposition to psychiatric treatment and as a result they are left largely undetected by 




public health practitioners. Unsurprisingly, when these individuals do make contact with 
mental health professionals it often occurs against the backdrop of some litigious 
undertaking or criminal complaint (Goldstein, 1995; Felthous, Stanislaus, Hempel, & 
Gleyzer, 2001). When individuals with paranoid ideation, who are characteristically 
querulous and suspicious, encounter the criminal justice system “[p]aranoid concerns 
may result in a range of troublesome or dangerous behaviors, from litigiousness and 
morbid jealousy, to more violent crimes” (Goldstein, 1995, p.304). Delusional 
convictions may impact a defendant's reasoning and actions across a range of legal 
domains, e.g., competency to confess or testamentary capacity in matters of civil 
litigation. When there is credible doubt that a defendant’s competency may be impaired 
the courts have a vested interest, based on the concept of fundamental fairness and due 
process protections, to take remedial action. 
The goal of competency evaluations is the determination of how the underlying 
clinical disorder impacts functional components of competency. As such, the incorrigible 
fault in judgment or thinking inherent to DD, long since recognized by scholars 
(Kahlbaum, 1878/2007; Kraepelin, 1904/1917; Jaspers 1923/1963), renders defendants 
with this illness ever more susceptible to such functional impairment, especially given the 
explicit emphasis on rational ability set out in current competency standards. Beyond 
mere factual knowledge about courtroom proceedings, problems with decisional capacity 
and the ability to work collaboratively with counsel in the pursuit of workable defense 
strategies underlines some of the challenges for defendants suffering with DD. The study 
now turns to a review of competency to stand trial and those factors salient to initial 
competency. 




Competency to Stand Trial 
 Standard and Procedural Aspects. Criminal competency encompasses a sizable 
portion of the judicial landscape ranging from pretrial issues such as competency to 
confess to posttrial matters involving sentencing. Over the years the Supreme Court has 
rendered a number of landmark decisions on criminal competency including, but not 
limited to, Dusky v. United States (1960), Godinez v. Moran (1993), and Indiana v. 
Edwards (2008). Even though courts recognize Dusky as the constitutionally minimal 
competency standard, subsequent Supreme Court decisions demonstrates the breadth and 
complexity of this legal construct. For example, in Godinez the Court proffered Dusky as 
a unitary competency standard, and more recently, appeared to rule against the latter 
notion by denying self-representation (a higher competency standard as argued by the 
majority) for an otherwise competent to stand trial, but mentally ill defendant in 
Edwards.   
 The law requires, based on the principles of fundamental fairness and due process 
protection, and to maintain the dignity of the adversarial process, that defendants be 
sufficiently present' to participate in the legal proceedings against them. By far the most 
commonly requested psycholegal evaluation across jurisdictions is for competency to 
stand trial (CST) or fitness to proceed. Estimates place the annual number of court-
ordered referrals for CST evaluations around 60,000 across the United States (Bonnie & 
Grisso, 2000) with concomitant financial expenditure that runs into hundreds of millions 
of dollars. And, although the specific statutes for CST vary across jurisdictions all states 




share common procedural underpinnings as well as the constitutionally minimal standard 
as set out in Dusky3 
 In Dusky v. United States (1960) the Supreme Court held that a defendant must 
have “sufficient present ability to consult with counsel” and a “reasonable degree of 
rational” as well as factual “understanding of the proceedings against him” (p. 402). 
Unlike mental state at the time of the offense CST refers to a defendant's mental state at 
the time of the trial, i.e., ability present during legal proceedings. Consequently being 
uncooperative or unwilling, or mere ignorance of criminal proceedings would not 
preclude a finding of competency.  
In criminal courts, competency implies an ability to understand the legal 
proceedings at hand and to participate meaningfully in the trial processes, what 
constitutes the sine qua non of a just legal system. The constitutionally minimal standard 
set out in Dusky (1960) serves to safeguard those with sufficiently severe impairment of 
their competence-related abilities, whether through mental illness and/or cognitive 
impairment, ensuring they are not put on trial without an assessment (and if needed 
remediation) of the aforementioned abilities.  
 The determination of competency involves a number of stages and is generally set 
in motion by a request for an evaluation of a defendant‘s CST. This initial request can be 
raised by any officer of the court and can occur at any given stage of adjudication 
whenever a "bona fide doubt" exists about a defendant's competency (Grisso, 2003). The 
US Supreme Court articulated the “bona fide doubt” standard in Drope v. Missouri 
(1975), and ruled that court principals (judge, defense, and/or prosecutor) had an 
                                                 
3 Subsequent cases such as Drope, Weiter, Godinez, and Edwards have elaborated on the Dusky standard. 




affirmative duty to raise competency concerns when warranted. An array of 
circumstances can set a CST evaluation in motion. For example, difficulties 
communicating with defense counsel, volatile or odd behavior displayed in the 
courtroom, the bizarreness of the alleged offense, or a prior history of IST can all prompt 
requests for competency evaluations. 
Following the court’s motion for an evaluation, the defendant is then evaluated by 
one or more mental health professionals, typically while still incarcerated (although a 
number of states also permit more cost-effective outpatient evaluation). Evaluation 
methods for CST vary across jurisdictions and mental health professionals and, as Cooper 
and Zapf (2003) point out, there is no singular, standardized tool to assess CST. The 
volume and quality of CST assessment instruments has seen steady development over the 
past few decades. Assessment in this area often includes structured, criterion-based 
psycholegal instruments (see Otto, 2006; see Scott, 2003) to more traditional measures of 
psychopathology and personality (Pirelli, Gottdiener, & Zapf, 2011). An effective CST 
evaluation will underscore the impact of a defendant's mental illness on their ability to 
understand the proceedings against them, and their ability to rationally assist defense 
counsel. Therefore, the fundamental determination for the forensic examiner is how "any 
psychopathological or cognitive difficulties [relate] to possible impairments in the 
defendant’s psycholegal abilities” (Skeem & Golding, 1998, p. 358).  
 If a judicial finding of IST is made following the court-ordered evaluation, a 
defendant is typically remanded to a period of inpatient treatment in a forensic mental 
health facility with the goal of competency restoration. Across most jurisdictions the 
forensic examiner will then offer an opinion about a defendant's competency, but the 




ultimate opinion rests with the trier of fact. However, as Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper, 
Wheeles, & Ronan (2004) point out, more often than not courts appear to abdicate this 
judicial opinion to forensic examiner s/clinicians.   
Existing research suggests that approximately 1 of every 4 defendants referred for 
a CST evaluation is adjudicated IST. Single studies with relatively large samples, for 
example Hubbard et al. (2003) with 468 defendants remanded for CST evaluation in 
Alabama, place the rate of IST findings around 20%. This is consistent with the modal 
estimate made by Roesch, Zapf, Golding, & Skeem (1999), and a recent meta-analytic 
study placing the base rate for IST findings at 27.5% (Pirelli et al., 2011).  
Defendants adjudicated competent proceed to trial, but when a defendant is found 
unfit to proceed or IST other potential outcomes unfold. Cases involving relatively minor, 
misdemeanor offenses are typically dismissed often with the agreement that the 
defendant will seek treatment. However, defendants are generally remanded when found 
IST to allow for a period of competency restoration. Jackson v. Indiana laid the 
groundwork for the adjudication of pretrial IST defendants, and the curtailment of 
indefinite civil commitment as a substitute for a criminal trial. In 1968, based on the 
existing statutes at the time, an Indiana court committed a Theon Jackson (a pretrial IST 
defendant) to the state Department of Mental Health until such time as he could be 
certified "sane". Mr. Jackson was deaf, mute, and illiterate, and charged with robbery. 
Defense counsel argued that Mr. Jackson's commitment was tantamount to 
indefinite/lifelong commitment since his condition was irremediable. After granting 
certiorari the US Supreme Court ultimately held in Jackson (1972) that a defendant 
found IST could not be held beyond a "reasonable period of time necessary to determine 




whether there is a substantial probability" of CST restoration "in the foreseeable future" 
(p.738).  Those not likely to be restored could either be civilly commitment or released, 
absent a finding of dangerousness.  
 Current data show that a number of states statutorily require IST defendants to be 
re-evaluated for adjudicative competence at least once every 6 months during the course 
of restoration (Grisso, Borum, Edens, Moye, & Otto, 2003). Additional time beyond the 
initial term for restoration is generally granted in cases where a reasonable likelihood of 
restoration exists. In cases where defendants are not restored to competency following a 
reasonable period of time, they are likely to be (conditionally) released pursuant to 
Jackson v. Indiana (1972) if they do not pose a substantial risk of harm. The duration of 
such commitments for restoration are statutorily determined, either comprising a set 
period of time or a proportion of the length of the sentence the defendant may have 
received if he were (competent and) convicted. In Jackson the Court did not explicitly 
specify what a "reasonable period" is and the statutes setting out the confinement periods 
of pretrial IST defendants varies notably across states. According to Kaufman, Way, and 
Suardi (2012) 28% of states specify a period of 1 year or less, 22% link the time period to 
the penalty of the charged offense, 20% specify a period of 1 to 10 years while another 
30% do not specify a limit. 
 The extant literature shows that defendants found IST typically suffer from more 
severe clinical disorders (Otto, 2006) and scholars consistently report a significant 
relationship between psychosis and adjudicative incompetence (Caldwell, Mandraccia, 
Ross, & Silver, 2003; Cooper & Zapf, 2003; Skeem, Golding, Cohn, & Berge, 1998; 
Pirelli et al., 2011; Warren, Rosenfeld, Fitch, & Hawk, 1997; Warren et al., 2006). 




Overall, current research suggests that defendants diagnosed with a psychotic disorders 
are found IST at a greater rate (Hubbart, Zapf, & Ronan, 2003). It is worth noting that a 
number of other variables have also been associated with IST outcomes (e.g., previous 
psychiatric hospitalization and unemployment). However, of the eight (sex; race; marital 
status; employment status; psychiatric diagnosis; psychiatric hospitalization history, CST 
evaluation history; and index criminal charge) variables examined in the meta-analysis by 
Pirelli et al. (2011) only psychiatric diagnosis and employment status showed statistical 
significance. Defendants with a psychotic disorder were eight times as likely to be found 
IST while the same likelihood was increased twofold for an unemployed defendant. The 
reader is referred to Pirelli et al. (2011) for a more comprehensive coverage of salient 
CST determinants. 
As a symptom of psychotic illness delusional beliefs, although not always bizarre, 
may come to incorporate a wide network of criminal justice principals4, and impair one 
or more of a defendant’s functional (criminal) competency-related abilities under the 
existing standards (e.g., competency to waive counsel and proceed pro se or competency 
to stand trial). Specific to competency to stand trial (CST), the focus of the current study, 
such impairment may include a defendant's ability to consult with counsel and/or his 
thinking about the proceedings against him. For example, Litwack (2003), citing relevant 
case law, illustrated the complexity in the adjudicative process brought about by the 
delusional thinking of criminal defendants. Specifically, he argued how a defendant may 
meet the threshold for competency to stand trial, but may not necessarily have the 
                                                 
4 In United States v. Ghane, 490 F.3d 1036 (2007), where the (criminal) defendant’s persecutory delusions 
incorporate defense counsel and magistrates in civil cases.  




competency to refuse a (viable) counsel recommended insanity defense in order to pursue 
their own delusionally moored defense. 
Of course a diagnosis in and of itself provides little information about a 
defendant’s ability to participate in judicial proceedings and is not synonymous with a 
finding of IST. For example, one study found as many as 80% of defendants with a 
psychotic disorder were ruled competent to stand trial by judges and mental health 
professionals (Viljoen, Roesch, & Zapf, 2002). Under Dusky, the presence of a mental 
disorder is only one step along the path of finding a defendant incompetent to proceed 
and any psychopathology needs to be related to deficits in psycholegal functioning 
(Skeem, Golding, Cohn, & Berge, 1998; Zapf & Roesch, 2009). As such the opposite 
also holds true, i.e., psychiatric symptom alleviation for an IST defendant may not 
necessarily mean successful restoration to competency.  
The cost, both personal and societal, of an IST finding can be substantial. For the 
defendant individual liberty is curtailed while states on their part incur a sizeable expense 
for the custodial care of IST defendants. In addition, once a defendant has been found 
incompetent to stand trial there is no failsafe way to predict his restorability. 
 
Competency Restoration 
There is a substantive body of research on initial evaluations and CST 
adjudications whereas research on competency restoration has been rather limited. This 
dearth of research on competency restoration is similarly highlighted by Zapf and Roesch 
(2011) in their review of data in this area. A finding of IST is not a clinical condition but 
a legal disposition and, as such, does not warrant clinical treatment. Also, there exists no 




standardized regimen for competency restoration. However, research has shown that most 
defendants (upwards of 70%) initially found unfit to proceed are returned to court within 
six months (Morris & Parker, 2008; Zapf & Roesch, 2011). Subsequent to a discussion of 




 Most treatment programs for CST restoration aim to diminish psychiatric 
symptoms while augmenting competency related abilities. CST restoration predominantly 
occurs within inpatient forensic mental health settings and the administration of 
psychotropic medication constitutes the most common treatment approach (Zapf & 
Roesch, 2011). 
Medication. The predominant use of antipsychotic medication across jurisdictions 
for CST restoration is understandable given the association between psychosis and 
findings of IST. In line with this, Zapf and Roesch (2009) note that successful outcomes 
in competency restoration often rest on the defendant’s response to drug treatment. 
However, over the past decade there has been a steady increase in the number of studies 
examining CST restoration approaches other than pharmacological intervention. Many 
restoration programs utilize a two-pronged approach of treating the underlying symptoms 
with group-based formats of psycholegal instruction alongside psychotropic medication 
(Meuller & Wylie, 2007).  In these groups, defendants are instructed about basic legal 
concepts and courtroom procedures using various didactic techniques (e.g., courtroom 
simulation or mock trials). In addition, defendants may also receive short-term cognitive 




behavioral intervention to address psychological problems relevant to their competency 
status. Overall, the body of research in this area is negligible (Mueller & Wylie, 2007; 
Zapf & Roesch, 2011) with little agreement about the effectiveness of these interventions 
in competency restoration (Mueller & Wylie, 2007).  
 Educational approaches. Although most pretrial defendants consent to treatment 
with antipsychotic medication (Zapf & Roesch, 2011) there are instances where such 
intervention is clinically not indicated and/or unwarranted. Further, the inherent 
invasiveness of psychotropic medication to render a defendant CST highlights the 
importance of alternative treatments. At least five previous studies have utilized 
educational/problem-solving strategies in CST restoration. Three of these education 
based approaches have utilized experimental designs (Mueller & Wylie, 2007; Bertman 
et al., 2003; Siegel & Elwork, 1990).  
 The first study, using random assignment, examined the effectiveness of a 
psycholegal intervention (a psycholegal game) specifically designed for competency 
restoration (Mueller & Wylie, 2007). Delivered in a group format, the psycholegal game 
(Fitness Game or FG) instructs participants with respect to key CST criteria and targets 
problem solving and reasoning abilities. The control group in this study were 
administered the Healthy Behaviors Game (HBG), which included material on symptom 
management and substance abuse, but not legal material. Consistent with the findings of 
Bertman et al. (2003), both the experimental (n = 21) and control (n = 17) groups in this 
study showed significant pretest to posttest improvements on the 22-item MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA). Overall Mueller 
and Wylie (2007) reported relatively small effect sizes, ranging from 0.02 to 0.3, and no 




significant posttest differences between the two groups were found on the MacCAT-CA. 
Their overall results did not support the use of the FG in competency restoration. 
 Bertman et al. (2003) assigned defendants to (1 of 3) treatment groups for 
psycholegal competency restoration, and found that all groups showed significant 
differences between pretest and posttest scores. The authors compared a legal rights 
education group; a deficit focused remediation group; and a standard hospital treatment 
group. Overall, treatment groups that included individual sessions fared better than the 
treatment as usual/standard hospital group. Specifically, the legal right education group 
and the deficit focused remediation group fared better on posttest scores of competency 
assessment instruments. However, based on the treatment design, it was not clear whether 
outcomes were attributable to the variable treatment formats (individual-group vs. group-
only intervention) and/or frequency of treatment. Bertman et al. (2003) argued that legal 
rights education was effective and less resource intensive since they found no significant 
difference between this intervention and the deficit remediation approach.  
 The final educational CST restoration approach to use experimental design was  
Siegel and Elwork (1990). In their study the experimental group received 
psychoeducation and instruction on legal concepts using video recording and discussion 
of courtroom procedure. In addition, the experimental group also took part in group 
problem solving sessions involving an actual legal case. These authors reported greater 
improvement on the Competency Assessment Instrument scores for the experimental 
(n=21) compared to the control (n=20) group. They also reported more CST 
recommendations by hospital staff for the experimental group (45%) compared to the 
control group (15%).  




 The remaining two studies on competency restoration treatments did not use 
random assignment. The first by Brown (1992) described a group based, didactic 
intervention structured around five different modules: nature of criminal charges; 
elements of specific charges; roles of participants in the trial process, the sequence of 
events during the trial process; and the consequences of different legal decisions and 
outcomes. 
 Noffsinger (2001) described a revised, multidisciplinary CST restoration 
approach that compromised seven discrete modules that included different materials, i.e., 
video recordings of trials, a mock trial, videotaped vignettes, and a written test. The 
modules included: education; anxiety reduction; a court officer guest lecture; a mock 
trial; court proceedings video; post-restoration; and legal current events.  Noffsinger 
(2001) reported improvement in the overall length of stay for the new CST restoration 
model compared to the earlier predominantly didactic program. He also reported 
competency restoration rates greater than 85% for major felony offenses (and >90% for 
lesser felonies). 
 Remediation for Cognitive Disability. Two studies have reported on CST 
restoration for defendants with developmental disabilities (mental retardation). Anderson 
and Hewitt (2002) reported on restoration outcomes for MR defendants detained at a 
habilitation facility compared to those detained at a psychiatric hospital and found better 
rates for the latter group (50% vs. 18%). The authors contend that the difference between 
the two groups may be attributable to the greater accessibility to psychiatric medication at 
the hospital facility. However, Anderson and Hewitt (2002) found that only one-third of 
their overall sample was restored to competency.   




A training program for defendants with mental retardation focused on repeated 
review to facilitate retention was described by Wall, Krupp, and Guilmette (2003). Their 
program (Slater Method) includes five sequential modules: (a) the purpose of the 
training, review of the charges, pleas, and potential consequences; (b) courtroom 
personnel; (c) courtroom proceedings, trial, and plea bargain; (d)communicating with the 
attorney, giving testimony, and assisting in defense; and (e) tolerating the stress of the 
proceedings. These modules are presented over a six-month period and can be extended 
in increments of six-months as required. Wall et al. (2003) reported CST restoration rates 
consistent with those of Anderson and Hewitt for this group of defendants. 
 In summary, non-pharmacological competency restoration approaches suggest 
there is some benefit to educational approaches that augment a defendant’s legal 
knowledge. However, the effectiveness of restoration programs for defendants with 
mental retardation appears to be limited. An important consideration across all restoration 
programs involves their cost effectiveness and resource requirements. Standardized, less 
time and labor intensive are likely to be prioritized. And for this reason, pharmacological 
intervention often stands first. Over time CST restoration strategies outside of 
psychotropic medication have evolved from basic instructive approaches to more varied 
and targeted approaches. Although much research in this area remains to be done the 









Factors Predictive of Restoration 
 Research on factors that predict successful restoration is not as comprehensive as 
studies examining factors salient to initial competency status. While the body of research 
examining predictors of initial CST status has grown steadily since the Supreme Court's 
judgment in Dusky the number of studies investigating restoration of competency have 
been negligible. The following section reviews a total of 6 studies, summarized in Table 
2, in this area. 
 
Table 2 
CST Restoration Studies 
Authors (N) Restoration Status Restoration Factor 
Rodenhauser and Khamis (1988) Adjudicated Axis I disorder and history of 
incarceration 
Anderson and Hewitt (2002) Adjudicated Cognitive disability/lower IQ 
Hubbard and Zapf (2003) Predicted Age and violent offense 
Hubbard et al. (2003) Predicted Does not understand legal 
proceedings 
Mossman (2007) Adjudicated Major psychotic illness and 
cognitive disability/MR 
Wolber (2008) Predicted Cognitive disability/MR 
  
 Through archival reviews a number of scholars have identified variables salient to 
predictions of restoration aside from responsiveness to psychotropic medication (Wolber, 




2008; Hubbard & Zapf, 2003; Hubbard et al., 2003). A 2008 survey of multiple forensic 
mental health facilities and evaluation sites across 45 states indicated that severe 
cognitive impairment (e.g., dementia or developmental disability) and refractory 
psychosis were the primary reasons for defendants not being restored to competency 
(Wolber, 2008). Severe cognitive impairment was the foremost reason for non-
restorability reported by 45 facilities in Wolber's telephone survey.   
 Hubbard and Zapf (2003) found evidence for criminal variables, i.e., violent index 
offenses and previous criminal history, as predictors of restorability. They found that 
defendants who were older and had a violent index offense were more likely to be found 
not restored compared to the younger counterparts who had non-violent index offenses. 
In addition, Hubbard and Zapf (2003) found defendants with non-psychotic minor 
disorders, prior mental health contact, prior use of psychotropic medication, and prior 
criminal histories more likely to be predicted restored. Together psychiatric diagnosis, 
psychiatric history, criminal history, and violent index offense accounted for 28% of the 
variance in their model with an accuracy rate of 53% (p < 0.001).  
 A number of state statutes require clinicians to render an opinion regarding the 
likelihood of restoration once a defendant has been found IST. Alabama statutes in the 
Hubbard et al. (2003) study similarly required clinicians to report on the likelihood of 
restoration. Overall, they found defendants predicted restorable were more likely to have 
a non-psychotic minor diagnosis, a past criminal history, and the ability to understand 
legal proceedings. In contrast, those predicted non-restorable were more likely to lack 
understanding of legal proceedings and were older. In the same way, Morris and Parker 
(2008) also reported that those diagnosed with a mood disorders were more likely to be 




restored than defendants diagnosed with a major psychotic disorder (i.e., schizophrenia). 
Together, these three studies provide data on factors predictive of CST restoration. 
 Some studies, on the other hand, have addressed the question of adjudicated CST 
restoration outcomes more directly, and consistent with other findings in this area suggest 
psychiatric variables (e.g., long-standing psychotic disorders with a history of extended 
prior inpatient hospitalization) and irremediable cognitive disorders are important 
determinants of non-restorability (Mossman, 2007; Anderson & Hewitt, 2002; 
Rodenhauser & Khamis, 1988). In an archival review of adjudicated CST restoration 
outcomes Mossman (2007) found that  defendants with a major psychotic disorder 
(schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder), mental retardation, extended hospital stays, 
older age, and misdemeanor offense had a decreased likelihood (<35%) of being 
adjudicated CST. Anderson and Hewitt (2002) explicitly examined the impact of mental 
retardation on competency restoration. Those defendants who were restored in their 
sample had significantly higher IQ scores than those who were not restored, M = 66.91 (p 
< 0.01) vs. M = 57.54 (p < 0.01) respectively. Also, these authors found that African 
American defendants were more likely to be restored than their White counterparts. In a 
review of 376 defendants who had their restoration status adjudicated Rodenhauser and 
Khamis (1988) found a number of significant predictors of CST restoration outcomes. 
Defendants without a major Axis I disorder and no prior history of incarceration were 
more likely to be adjudicated restored. Overall, the extant literature suggests irremediable 
cognitive deficits and longstanding psychotic illness are inversely related to CST 
restoration status while the data on past criminal history and offense type appear more 
equivocal.  




Involuntary Medication and Restoration 
 In Harper (1990) the Supreme Court held that an individual has a "significant 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of 
antipsychotic drugs" (p.93). Even though the majority of IST defendants consent to drug 
treatment (Zapf & Roesch, 2011) the constitutional right to refuse treatment has long 
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. While courts may consider educational 
approaches to CST restoration less invasive the use of antipsychotic drugs remains by far 
the leading method to achieve this goal, The rates of involuntary treatment of pretrial 
defendants are not well known, but a recent study by Cochrane, Herbel, Reardon, and 
Lloyd (2012) estimates that 1 in 36,000 federal defendants undergoes such treatment. 
Moreover, data on rates of medication refusal for pretrial defendants is sparse. In the 
absence of medication, the condition of a deluded individual would conceivably remain 
unchanged and it is not uncommon for efforts to medicate to be incorporated into their 
delusional system (Felthous et al., 2001). Consequently, delusional IST defendants with 
impaired decisional capacity can go on to proffer seemingly rational reasons for refusing 
treatment.  
 Prior to Sell v. United States (2003) incompetent pretrial defendants were 
medicated based on Washington v. Harper (1990). Harper, who had been incarcerated in 
a Washington correctional facility following a parole revocation, contended that he had 
been denied a hearing to determine possible violation of due process by being forced to 
take medication. Disagreeing with Harper the Supreme Court ruled that the involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic medication without a judicial hearing was acceptable in 
cases of serious mental illness where an inmate posed a danger to himself or others. The 




Court further held that such involuntary medication should be in the inmate’s medical 
interest. In many ways Harper set the standard for the forcible medication of pretrial 
detainees. This permissible compromise set out by the Court also extends to instances of 
grave disability. 
Still, avoiding forcible medication is a constitutionally protected interest as 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Riggins v. Nevada (1992). In Riggins the Supreme 
Court explicitly addressed forcible medication of pretrial detainees. In his appeal Riggins 
argued that the state violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by forcibly 
medicating him during trial (as he pursued an insanity defense). Mr. Riggins had been 
convicted for capital murder and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and later reversed the lower court’s decision holding that protections against 
involuntary medication, absent overriding judicial interests or medical appropriateness, 
also extend to pretrial detainees (as with inmates in Harper). In Riggins the Supreme 
Court held that pretrial defendants had a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment 
not to be forcibly medicated. The Court further held that Riggins was denied a full and 
fair trial under the Sixth Amendment based on his argument that the adverse side effects 
of his (involuntarily administered) antipsychotic medication (thioridazine) impaired his 
competency during criminal proceedings. 
After Riggins the landmark Supreme Court case of Sell v. United States (2003) 
sought to elucidate the conditions for involuntary medication, specifically for 
competency restoration of not yet adjudicated defendants. Charles Sell faced multiple 
counts of Medicaid and mail fraud, and was ordered to undergo involuntary treatment 
after the lower court held that he posed a danger to himself and others. Sell, who was 




diagnosed with a delusional disorder, appealed the decision of forcible medication by the 
district court, a decision that the appellate court later affirmed. The Supreme Court, in a 
6-to-3 decision, vacated and remanded the appellate decision. The Court held that 
forcible medication for the sole purpose of competency restoration of a pretrial defendant 
who is facing serious criminal charges was permissible under certain circumstances. 
Therefore, before an order of involuntary medication can be issued, under Sell 
four key factors have to be established. First, to bring a defendant accused of a serious 
crime to trial the court must find that important governmental/state interests are at stake. 
Second, the court has to find that forcible medication will significantly further these state 
interests, and likely render the defendant competent to proceed. The court further has to 
find that involuntary medication per se (and not another, perhaps less intrusive option) is 
necessary to further the states interests. Finally, it has to be shown that drug treatment is 
medically appropriate, and in the patient’s best medical interest. Since Sell was not a 
danger to himself or others the Court subsequently held that he could not be forcibly 
medicated without consideration of the aforementioned factors.  
Upon cursory examination, the first and third prongs in Sell appear less fraught 
with difficulty when confronted with a delusional defendant accused of a violent crime. 
Governmental interests are generally greater for violent felonies and, as for the third 
factor, the administration of neuroleptics drugs is widely viewed as the primary mode of 
treatment for psychotic patients. However, the available data on treatment outcomes for 
delusional patients and clinical perceptions suggests that factors two and four stipulated 
in Sell may be particularly difficult to navigate. 




Firstly, the Supreme Court decision in Sell accentuated the importance of the 
efficacy and side effect profiles of medications that are administered involuntarily in the 
fourth prong of Sell. Even though the side effect profiles for newer antipsychotics are not 
as troublesome, relatively recent data suggests that the use of first generation 
antipsychotics remains prevalent in the treatment of delusional disorder (Herbel & 
Stelmach, 2007).  Medication side effects are not only important in terms of a pretrial 
defendant's ability to assist counsel, but can also influence the trier of fact's perception of 
a defendant. For example, a defendant's blunted affect during a trial, brought on by his 
psychotropic medication, could be erroneously interpreted by a jury as a lack of remorse. 
More recent cases, such as that of Jared Loughner in Tucson (AR), further 
demonstrate the complexity of forcibly medicating pretrial defendants who are initially 
considered non-dangerous while in custody. Loughner was initially able to obtain an 
injunction against forcible medication after the Ninth Circuit Court found that 
governmental interests to prevent harm to others was outweighed by his interest to avoid 
the side effects of involuntary medication. The court argued that Loughner was under 
custodial care for six months without any injury to anyone. However, this injunction was 
later lifted by the same court after the government was able to successfully argue that 
Loughner's deteriorating (and potentially dangerous) mental state posed a danger (to 
himself). The government argued that antipsychotic medication was the sole method to 
ameliorate this danger.  
In reference to the second Sell prong, promoting concomitant governmental 
interests implies that the medication administered will be substantially likely to restore a 
pretrial defendant to competency. As noted, being found incompetent to stand trial is not 




a clinical condition, but the restoration of incompetent defendants does primarily rest on 
medical intervention. Consequently, the relatively obscure prognostic profile and the 
limited outcome data for delusional disorder have the potential to obfuscate any informed 
judgment about the likelihood of competency restoration for this subset of pretrial 
detainees.  
A number of federal circuit courts have addressed the issue of involuntary 
medication of delusional pretrial defendants subsequent to Sell (e.g., United States v. 
Ghane, 2004; United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 2010). In Ghane, a defendant diagnosed 
with delusional disorder, was found incompetent to stand trial and appealed an order of 
involuntary medication. Hessam Ghane was facing federal charges for the possession of a 
chemical weapon (potassium cyanide). The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals held that he 
could not be medicated involuntarily based on the substantially likely (to restore 
competence; second prong) factor set out in Sell v. United States (2003). After reviewing 
testimony from at least four psychiatrists, the judge concluded that 90% of patients 
diagnosed with delusional disorder do not improve with treatment and, reversing the 
district court's decision, ruled that the state had not met the burden for establishing the 
second Sell factor. The psychiatric testimony proffered explained that only a 10% of 
these patients experience symptom reduction when treated with psychotropic medication 
– a scenario where restoration to competency is improbable. 
Similarly, consider the case of Ruiz-Gaxiola where the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision on forcible medication. Ruiz-Gaxiola, who had 
an extensive criminal history and had entered the United States illegally, was diagnosed 
with delusional disorder and sent to a Federal Medical Center (FMC) after being found 




IST. The court ruled, based primarily on defense expert testimony about the refractory 
nature of the defendant’s clinical disorder, that involuntary medication for Ruiz-Gaxiola 
was medically inappropriate (more so as he posed no danger to himself or others, as per 
Harper, in the FMC). 
Common to both cases and Sell is the defendants’ diagnosis (delusional disorder) 
and one can recognize the weight accorded to the different Sell factors due in large part to 
expert testimony proffered on the reputed prognostic profile of the disorder. Thus, the 
contention previously highlighted in the psychiatric nosology around the prognosis of 
delusional disorder can also inform forensic opinions albeit that subtle facts and evidence 
surrounding each case supports the individual courts’ decisions. Taken together, the 
circumstances for forcibly medicating an incompetent pretrial defendant as set out Sell 
are not by any means straightforward.  
 
Delusional Disorder and Restoration Outcomes 
Within the context of the high base rate for restorability, Zapf and Roesch (2009) 
note that the accurate identification of poor treatment responses holds the greatest 
heuristic value, and further stress that the overall predictive accuracy of mental health 
professionals in this area is low. Few defendants who are evaluated for CST are found 
incompetent and even fewer of those are judged non-restorable. For defendants with 
delusional disorder the dearth of empirical studies on treatment outcome rates further 
compounds the probability of false positives (non-responders predicted to be restorable).   
Relatively recent contributions such as those by Felthous et al. (2001) draw on 
existing clinical literature in their discussion of defendants with delusional disorder. From 




their brief review of pharmacotherapy with persecutory delusions these authors make the 
argument that atypical antipsychotics may be more favorable in the treatment of 
delusions given their efficacy in thought disorders. In addition, they contend that mood 
stabilizing agents may help curb the impulse to act in delusional patients (Felthous et al., 
2001). They ultimately argue for an approach that strikes a balance between patient 
autonomy and treatment standards in the forensic setting. The review by Felthous and 
colleagues also illustrates how the lack of clinical outcome data for delusional patients 
can provide fertile ground for treatment refusal based on seemingly rational arguments. 
Defendants (as with clinical patients) often provide a network of spurious evidence to 
support their inferences where efforts to medicate are duly incorporated into the 
delusional system. 
To date there have only been two published studies directly investigating 
competency restoration for defendants diagnosed with delusional disorder. In a 
retrospective review of 22 pretrial federal cases of defendants who had undergone 
involuntary medication hearings from 1990-2003, Herbel and Stelmach (2007) found 
evidence of favorable treatment responses to a range of antipsychotic medications. The 
majority of defendants in their sample (n = 16) suffered persecutory delusions, and close 
to 60% of those defendants restored to competency were treated with a single typical 
antipsychotic. In addition, all of the defendants in their sample showed a favorable 
response to treatment after a minimum of three uninterrupted months of treatment, and 
approximately 77% were considered restored to competence. Although the sample size 
for this study was small the results open interesting avenues for future investigation, not 
only regarding the restorability of pretrial DD defendants, but also whether specific 




delusional themes (e.g., persecutory themes involving governmental conspiracy) 
differentially impact responsiveness to treatment. 
A subsequent study by Cochrane et al. (2012) examined the rates and outcomes 
for federal felony defendants who had undergone treatment under the Sell criteria. Forty-
four defendants in their overall sample (N = 287) were diagnosed with DD and of those 
15 were granted an order of involuntarily treatment. The majority (73%) of those DD 
defendants treated under Sell were restored to competency. 
While these studies serve to advance our knowledge of treatment outcomes in 
forensic settings for defendants diagnosed with DD their respective authors highlight a 
number of methodological shortcomings. Aside from the standard limitations that plague 
retrospective analysis, they also point to the small number of DD cases in their samples. 
Notwithstanding, their findings are instructive and assist in orienting future studies, more 
so when one considers the tentative argument that the forensic setting facilitates greater 
adherence to medication trials, which, in turn, may show less than expected positive CST 
restoration (and perhaps clinical) outcomes for defendants diagnosed with DD.   
 
Rationale 
Treatment outcome data for IST defendants with DD, and (more broadly) their 
clinical counterparts, is severely limited. Notwithstanding, delusional ideation has been 
broadly recognized as common to a number of psychotic disorders. Scholars have 
reported prevalence rates between 10-15% for delusional ideation in non-clinical 
populations (Freeman, 2006) and the recent de-emphasis on bizarreness in DSM-V points 
to a likely increase in DD prevalence rates. However, the treatment of delusional disorder 




continues to lag behind partly due to low prevalence rates and the perception that this 
illness is intractable. However, recent findings suggest that the course of the disorder is 
variable, and that treatment often includes a broad spectrum of psychotropic drugs. 
Similar perspectives and trends have been noted in forensic settings where minimal data 
is available to guide standards of care for delusional, incompetent pretrial defendants. 
Although the majority of defendants who are ruled IST suffer psychotic symptoms the 
base rate for those with delusional disorder within this group is low, further limiting 
efforts to study and treat this particular population. And, while the existing judicial 
standard explicates guidelines for involuntary medication of IST defendants, numerous 
questions are left unanswered, not merely as a result of the wording of the Sell standard, 
but because of a clinical condition (DD) with no established treatment protocol and a 
disputed prognostic profile.  In the absence of data on treatment outcomes these 
defendants face the prospect of protracted criminal commitment (Felthous et al., 2001)5. 
A primary goal of the proposed study was to further our clinical understanding of  
treatment efforts within the context of competency restoration as well as offer some 
insight into existing forensic dispositions for DD IST defendants.  
Some researchers in the area make the finer diagnostic distinction between 
psychotic disorders, and argue that the trial period (and therefore time to restorability) for 
treating DD in forensic samples exceeds that for schizophrenia (Herbel & Stelmach, 
2007). In the same way, clinical trials with DD cases have been criticized for their 
relatively short treatment duration (see for example Silva et al., 1998). However, current 
                                                 
5 Cf. Sell v. United States (2003) where the court suggests that lengthy confinement stemming from 
medication refusal negates the risks associated with the release of a criminal defendant 




empirical data shows that the overwhelming majority of IST defendants receiving 
inpatient treatment are restored within the statutory time frame (Zapf & Roesch, 2009). 
Whether or not this particular conclusion holds true for DD defendants found 
incompetent to proceed remains unclear. And so, another aim of the current study was to 
exam whether the majority of DD pretrial defendants referred for restoration are indeed 
restorable within an initial statutory timeframe (as with their other IST counterparts).  
So, while not synonymous with clinical recovery, restoration of competency in 
forensic settings for DD defendants should provide adequate trial periods for treatment. 
Still, whether such outcomes are equally robust for purportedly intractable psychotic 
disorders such as delusional disorder is not clear.  
Further, the financial burden and time associated with adjudicative competence is 
well documented (Golding, 1992) and the high base rate for competency restoration 
suggests that the accurate identification of poor responses to treatment holds superior 
heuristic value (Zapf & Roesch, 2009). More especially, most defendants found IST and 
unlikely to be restored are housed in costly forensic mental health facilities. As a result, 
identification of symptoms that contribute to decreased restorability could more readily 
facilitate timely placement planning and intervention in less cost intensive settings, such 
as transitional living facilities (TLF) or outpatient treatment centers.  
Previous studies have predominantly focused on the relationship between broad 
psychiatric diagnosis and CST abilities. In their review of the CST restoration literature, 
Zapf and Roesch (2011) identified three salient factors common to non-restored 
defendants: a diagnosis of mental retardation, older age, and a diagnosis of psychotic 
disorder. These (and other) authors argue that a reliance on diagnostic classification and 




the oversimplification of competency as a construct precludes a more detailed 
understanding of how specific symptoms impact competency related abilities (Jacobs, 
Ryba, & Zapf, 2008; Zapf & Roesch, 2011). More specifically, Zapf and Roesch note, 
“[I]nformation regarding specific symptoms and specific competency related 
abilities…would be more useful” (p. 44). A more circumscribed focus on symptoms may 
therefore offer more reliable data rather than targeting diagnostic categories. So, not only 
have few studies focused on CST restoration (compared to initial CST findings), but 
fewer still have investigated the role of specific symptoms on CST abilities and related 
restoration outcomes. The current study aimed to contribute to this avenue of research. 
Finally, while the use of medication to treat IST defendants remains 
commonplace, questions regarding the suitability of such treatment and the rates at which  
delusional defendants  accept or refuse treatment  are not well  well understood. 
 
Research Questions 
The primary questions to be posed in the current study can be formulated as follow: 
Q1: What proportion of defendants with psychotic symptoms, remanded for 
competency restoration, suffer with DD?  
Q2: What is the competency restoration rate for defendants with DD, absent other 
psychotic and affective symptoms, after a single, statutorily determined (120 day) 
period of treatment at the FMC? 




Q3: Is there a difference in the rates of competency restoration between defendants 
with DD (absent other psychotic and affective symptoms), and defendants with 
other psychotic symptoms after a single CST restoration period/study period6.  
Q4: Is the average length of stay (LOS) for DD IST defendants different from that of 
IST defendants with other psychotic symptoms for a preliminary 120 day 
restoration period? 
Q5: Do the dimensional ratings of action and pervasiveness of delusions impact 
restorability?  
 Q6: Does impairment of specific competency related abilities differ for DD defendants 
compared to defendants suffering other psychotic symptoms?  











                                                 
6 The terms restoration period, study period, and period of evaluation and treatment are used 
interchangeably throughout. 






This primary goal of the present study was to investigate the competency 
restoration rates of IST defendants with DD and contrast this group with defendants who 
exhibit other psychotic symptoms. More specifically, the study also identified how specific 
psychotic symptoms impact competency related abilities. In this section, a methodological 
account of the study is provided, including an overview of relevant ethical concerns. 
Sample Demographics. The majority of the all-male defendants in the current 
sample (N = 201) were either White (36%) or Hispanic (35%) followed by African 
American (22%). The remainder of the sample included defendants of Asian (4), African 
(3), Caribbean, Middle Eastern (3), and Native American (1) descent with an overall mean 
age of 42.26 (SD = 10.71). The mean level of education for the 201 men in the sample was 
9.72 years (SD = 3.26) and of the 158 with data on employment status 132 (83.5%) were 
unemployed at the time of arrest. Data were also available on the employment history of 
108 men and the occupational categories are listed in Table 3 below. Most men were not 
married (55%) while the rest were either divorced or separated (35%), married (8%), or 
widowed (2%). A total of 154 cases had data on prior convictions and/or arrests, and 79% 
of defendants had a prior conviction and/or arrest. The proportion of violent prior offenses 










Defendant Employment Categories by History 
Occupational Classification n % 
Agricultural/Landscaping 14 13.0 
Construction/Manual labor 30 27.8 
Fast food/Counter work 16 14.8 
Administrative/Clerical 14 13.0 
Technical/Skilled labor 13 12.0 
Professional 3 2.8 
Mostly Unemployed 12 11.1 
Otherᵃ 6 5.6 
N = 201, ᵃSelf employed 
 
In terms of current criminal charges the most common were illegal re-entry, 
firearms, and substance related offenses. Index offenses for the defendants in the sample 
are listed in Table 4. Nine defendants (4.5%) had an additional index offense in a 
different category. The 11 index offenses listed under “Other” included crimes involving 











Current Index Offenses for CST Restoration Defendants 
Index Offense n (%) Add. Index Offense (n) 
Murder/Attempted Murder 4 (2.0)  
Sex Offense 14 (7.0)  
Assault 23 (11.4)  
Firearms/Weapons 32 (15.9) 2 
Robbery 9 (4.5) 2 
Illegal Re-entry 46 (22.9)  
Substance Related 27 (13.4) 1 
Fraud 14 (7.0)  
Threats to Injure/Kill 21 (10.4) 2 
Other 11 (5.5) 2 
N = 201 
 
Procedure 
The current study was approved by the Bureau of Prisons Research Review Board 
(BRRB), which oversees institutional research at the Federal Medical Center (FMC) in 
Butner.  An archival review of cases remanded for competency restoration to FMC 
(Butner) by the court pursuant to Title 18 USC §4241(d) were reviewed. The five (5) year 
time period covered was from 2009-2013.  The proceedings for section 4241 are 
described in Appendix B. The forensic team responsible for the 4241(d) treatment and 
evaluation reports include a primary evaluator, i.e., a staff psychologist or psychiatrist 




along with either psychiatric or psychological consultation respectively. Data and 
feedback from correctional, medical, and mental health staff is also incorporated into the 
competency restoration process. The forensic assessments data from these files included 
clinical interviews, reviews of medicolegal and index offense data, observations by BOP 
staff members, psychological testing, and other collateral data. All IST cases, including 
those involving involuntary treatment were included  
FMC Butner admission summary data indicates that the average annual number of 
4241(d) referrals alone is close to 240 (Dr. Edward Landis, personal communication, 
2015). Most defendants referred for restoration at the FMC are treated with psychotropic 
medication. In addition, defendants are also have the opportunity to participate in a once 
weekly Competency Restoration Class. Individual cognitive behavioral therapy is also 
offered to defendants where appropriate. All forensic evaluations were completed by 
licensed clinicians (psychologists and psychiatrists) within the inpatient FMC setting. 
Federal statutes require that evaluations and treatment be completed within a period of 
four months.  
Preliminary Case Selection. Research on CST and particularly competency 
restoration has shown that most defendants adjudicated IST suffer with psychotic 
symptoms. A directory search was conducted of all 4241(d) or CST restoration cases for 
the calendar years 2009 to 2013. Cases were identified by a BOP health systems 
specialist using the following search terms: psychosis, psychotic, psychotic feature*, 
delusions, paranoi*, schizo*, mood with, depression, and bipolar. Approximately 25% of 
cases were sampled from each of the five calendar years spanning from 2009 to 2013. 
Consecutive alphabetical cases were drawn from each year with alternate years running 




in reverse order (from the letter "Z" upwards). All cases were de-identified by the health 
systems specialist prior to coding. After initial selection cases were coded for psycholegal 
variables and symptoms were scored using the extended 24-item version of the Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale/BPRS (Lukoff, Nuechterlein, & Ventura, 1986) and ultimately 
divided into 3 subgroups based on BPRS scores. Cases were also coded for comorbid 
cognitive disability/mental retardation and substance disorder. In order to detect a 
medium effects size (ES=.15) for α=.05 and up to five predictors in the model Cohen 
(1992) suggests a sample size of N≥182. 
Exclusions. Adjudicative competence speaks to present ability; thus, it is a 
dynamic construct that includes the potential for fluctuation in a defendant’s competency 
related abilities. Therefore, to rule out multiple observations of any one defendant/case, 
all cases where a defendant’s psychiatric condition deteriorated (for example, due to non-
adherence to the prescribed medication) resulting in a return to the FMC were excluded. 
In addition, all cases with a documented history of body dysmorphic disorder, paranoid 
personality disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder were excluded. Cases where 
concerns about potential malingering were raised during and/or upon conclusion of the 4-
month restoration period were also excluded. Further exclusions were cases with a 
documented and/or diagnosed cognitive disorder, and/or documented traumatic brain 
injury (TBI), and/or dementia. Although specific psychiatric symptoms and subsequent 
classification of DD were the focus of this study data on differential diagnosis was also 
recorded at the end of the coding protocol in order to identify the aforementioned 
exclusion categories. Clinicians used DSM-IV-TR for diagnostic coding for the time 
period covered by the current study. 




Data Coding. Study data included socio-demographic, psycholegal, and 
psychiatric symptom (BPRS) variables coded from the case files of pretrial defendants 
remanded for CST restoration. Appendix A lists the key variables coded for the study. In 
collaboration with administrative staff at the FMC relevant cases were identified and then 
coded by the principal investigator (PI). Approximately 10% of the cases7 were randomly 
selected to assess interrater reliability.  To facilitate this process a staff psychologist (KB) 
underwent training on the coding manual, which included instruction on the archival use 
of the BPRS, and this rater (KB) has extensive experience with the data contained in the 
forensic/4241(d) reports as well as the CST abilities outlined in the coding manual.  
 
Interrater Reliability 
Raters reviewed two reports in each cluster of twenty to identify coding problems 
and disagreements. Percent agreements were calculated for all data points except for the 
BPRS and dimensional ratings of delusions. Rater agreement was >97%, and discrepant 
scoring was for a single item (date in custody), coded as missing by KB, but recorded 
from collateral data by the principal investigator. Subsequent cases were revised 
accordingly. 
Weighted Kappa coefficients were calculated for the BPRS ratings. The following 
weights were assigned for absolute differences in scoring on the expanded 24-item 
BPRS: 1 = full agreement, partial agreement .75 = |1|, .50 = |2|, .25 = |3|, and no 
                                                 
7 A case refers to a study period and not a defendant who may (or may not) have had multiple court-ordered 
studies for the same index offense. 
 




agreement 0 = |4|, as well as 0 = presence vs. absence and/or one rater ≥4 and the other 
<4. Coding for the BPRS showed good interrater reliability with Kappa = .67. This 
coefficient was somewhat lower than previous interrater reliability data for archival use 
of the BPRS, however, the latter were interclass correlations (Adachi et al., 2000) based 
on the sum of rater scores.  
Simple Kappa coefficients were calculated for dimensional ratings of delusions, 
and yielded substantial agreement, Kappa = .775, p < .05. The latter coefficient supports 
the notion that the dimensional constructs of action and pervasiveness are amenable to 
archival review.  
Variables included in the structured coding protocol included both categorical and 
continuous data, and where numeric values were not assigned data were entered as string. 
Instances where variable information was incomplete/missing/unknown were recorded as 
=99 (or -9 as applicable).  
Outcomes regarding competency restoration were based on the conclusions of 
forensic evaluators (rather than clinical ratings of recovery)8, and specific competency 
related abilities that were impaired upon admission to the FMC were also coded. The 
broad designations of rational and factual understanding, and ability to relate to defense 
counsel as set out in Dusky can render the coding of CST abilities somewhat vague. 
Skeem et al. (1998) identified 11 global psycholegal domains to address this shortcoming 
in the coding structure of CST reports. The functional abilities identified by these authors 
(see Table 5) help to elucidate the language captured in Dusky. Accordingly, CST 
                                                 
8 Previous reviews typically rated recovery on a continuum (Manschrek & Khan, 2006; Munro & Mok, 
1995) 
 




abilities were coded as they appeared (string) within the initial CST evaluations. Finally, 
for cases where a defendant was charged with multiple offenses only the most serious 
charge was applied in subsequent analysis. Based on the judgments of forensic evaluators 




Capacity to participate in trial  
Capacity to testify relevantly 
Capacity to understand the adversary nature of proceedings 
Capacity to disclose relevant information to counsel 
Basic knowledge of legal strategies and options 
Relationship with counsel 
Capacity for reasoned choice among options 
Capacity for reasoned choice among options 
Capacity to behave appropriately in court 
Capacity to appreciate charges 
Capacity to appreciate potential penalties 
Medication effects on CST 
* Listed by Skeem et al. (1998) 
 Dimensions of Delusions. Two variables from the MacArthur-Maudsley 
Assessment of Delusions Schedule (Appelbaum et al., 1999), which provide a non-
content based, dimensional perspective of delusions were included in the coding manual. 




These are pervasiveness and action – the two dimensions most amenable to retrospective 
analysis from the MacArthur study. Pervasiveness refers to the degree to which the 
delusional belief penetrates into areas of the defendant’s life, and is scored on a four point 
scale ranging from not at all to virtually all experiences as related to the delusional 
conviction/ belief (range 0-3). Action refers to the extent to which the defendant’s index 
offense was motivated by the delusional belief, and ranges from 0-5, i.e., no actions, to 
nonaggressive actions only, aggressive thoughts, aggressive acts without injury to victim, 
aggressive acts with unknown injury to victim, and finally to violence with injury or use 
of weapons Using the MacArthur-Maudsley Delusions Assessment Schedule (a modified 
version of the Maudsley Delusions Assessment Schedule), Appelbaum et al. (1999) 
found support for a two-factor structure in a dimensional assessment of delusions. Data 
from 328 psychiatric inpatients in the multisite MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment 
Study revealed a two factor solution, which they labeled intensity/scope and affect/action 
respectively. This solution showed consistency, independent of diagnosis, in a sample 
where 71% of the delusional patients were schizophrenic and more than 10% suffered a 
mood disorder, and accounted for more than two-thirds of the variance (Appelbaum et al., 
1999) in their model.  
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS). The 24-item BPRS (Expanded Version) 
was developed to assess change in psychiatric symptoms over time within a treatment 
context (Lukoff et al., 1986). Scores on the BPRS are rated on a 0 (not assessed) to 7 
(extremely severe) scale, (see Appendix B adapted from Lukoff et al., 1986). The BPRS 
has been widely used across a range of settings and application of the instrument is 
relatively uncomplicated with investigators reporting excellent interrater reliability scores 




(Lachar et al., 2001). Factor analytic research using the expanded BPRS in forensic 
settings has identified five subscales or symptom clusters: Psychoticism; Thought 
Disorder; Depression; Mania; and Withdrawal (Jacobs, Ryba, & Zapf, 2008). Further, 
CST research with the BPRS has shown that the Psychoticism cluster is most strongly 
associated with IST findings (Jacobs et al., 2008). Although not ideal for retrospective 
coding using the BPRS to empirically review archival data has been established in the 
literature (Adachi et al., 2000; Mullins, Pfefferbaum, Schultz, & Overall, 1986). 
First, all cases with documented psychotic symptoms upon admission to the FMC 
pursuant to a remand for CST restoration were included for analysis. BPRS data were 
coded from the admission data contained within the forensic reports. To minimize rater 
bias, BPRS data was coded prior to extracting data on comorbidity in the differential 
diagnosis section.  
To be classified as DD relevant BPRS items, i.e., 1 (somatic concerns), 5 (guilt), 8 
(grandiosity), and 9 (suspiciousness) were content coded to identify delusional disorder 
cases. BPRS scoring requires that DD cases have a score of ≥6 on the aforementioned 
items. In addition to identifying delusional content for items 1, 5, 8, and 9, DD case 
classification required: ≤2 on any Psychoticism cluster items, ≤2 on item 12 (Thought 
Disorder cluster), and ≤3 on any Depression, Mania and/or Withdrawal cluster item. The 
decision chart for the different group (DD, schizophrenia, and mood disorder with 
psychotic features) assignments is outlined in Figure 1. Consistent with BPRS coding 
items were coded 'N/A" when relevant clinical data was not documented for the specified 
period within the 4241(d) report. 






BPRS Classification of Three Clinical Groups
Restoration Cases Listing Psychotic Symptoms











NO Item score ≥4:
Conceptual Disorganization
Hallucination, Disorientation
NO Item score ≥4: 




Somatic concerns, Guilt, 
Grandiosity, Suspiciousness
Delusional Disorder




Although the distinction between bizarre and nonbizarre delusions to differentiate 
between DD and schizophrenia is no longer salient in the current diagnostic nosology this 
distinction has been retained as a specifier in DSM-V. Accordingly, delusional content on 
any of the DD items was coded as nonbizarre or bizarre, and items 5, 8, and 9 on BPRS 
were reviewed to determine the bizarreness of the delusional content (if present).  
  
Statistical Analysis. First, descriptive statistics for the study variables are reported 
followed by independent samples t tests and nonparametric comparisons for different 
groups. Logistic regression was utilized to determine the study variables predictive of 
restoration outcomes (0=not restored; 1=restored). The preference for logistic regression 
is based on its more flexible assumptions and types of data open to analysis. Logistic 
regression also facilitates both categorical and continuous variables, the predictors do not 
have to be normally distributed or have a linear relationship, and are not required to have 
equal variance within each group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Model predictors were 
assessed for univariate outliers and multicollinearity, and goodness-of-fit tests together 
with relevant model fit indices were reported. The Wald statistic was used to report the 
significance of individual coefficients. Preference was accorded to those predictor 
variables with an empirical basis in the determination of initial CST status and 
restoration, as well as those variables with a significance level of α≤0.5  were retained in 
the model assessment.  
  
 




Ethical Concerns and Data Protection. All identifying information about 
defendants (or their alleged victims) was anonymized. Identifying data were removed 
from the research database. No data from the FMC files was copied, and links to 
identifiable data were retained at the FMC. These links were destroyed once study data 
had been fully analyzed. Anonymized, coded data were stored in a secure facility at John 
Jay College and all electronic documents related to the study were encrypted and 
password protected. All data from this study will be destroyed in accordance with federal 
law, American Psychological Association (APA) standards, and university (CUNY) 
policies. The principal investigator completed training on the federally required Human 




















This chapter provides descriptive statistics for psycholegal and clinical variables 
followed by an examination of group means, and were applicable results from non-
parametric analysis such as Chi-square tests of independence are presented. Finally, 
logistic regression results are outlined for the criterion variable, i.e., CST status. All data 
were analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 22. 
 
Data Characteristics 
 The reports by forensic evaluators were comprehensive and structured to include 
identifying data for the case, procedures administered, background information, and the 
course of treatment and evaluation while at the FMC. A wide range of sources comprised 
the collateral information reviewed in the forensic reports. An example, but by no means 
an exhaustive list includes: data from the criminal complaint, prior CST evaluations, 
transcripts from court proceedings, law enforcement reports, correspondence with the 
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) and defense counsel, interviews with family 
members and previous treatment providers, and existing medical records.  
Data on the defendants’ institutional progress was similarly detailed and included 
a discrete mental status examination upon admission, clinical interviews and 
observations, a physical examination along with admission laboratory tests, and relevant 
clinical-forensic assessments.  
 These assessments included data from standardized measures such as the 
Examination of Competency to Stand Trial - Revised (ECST-R), the MacArthur 




Competency Assessment Test - CA), and the Revised Competency Assessment 
Instrument (R-CAI). Data from malingering and feigning instruments such the Test of 
Memory Malingering (TOMM), Structured Interview of R Symptoms (SIRS), and the 
Validity Profile Indicator (VPI) was included were indicated. Finally, numerous data 
from cognitive, personality, and symptom profile measures were also included. 
A total of 232 individual competency restoration cases pursuant to Title 18 
Section 4241(d) were reviewed for the current study. Competency to stand trial once 
restored is not an immutable state and consequently new 4241(d) referrals for the same 
defendant are to be expected. Cases where defendants were transported from the FMC by 
US Marshalls after completion of a treatment and evaluation period, and then 
subsequently returned pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. Section 4241(d) were excluded. These 
subsequent forensic reports provided data on a second or later evaluation and treatment 
periods, and were excluded regardless of the time difference between 4241(d) 
designations. These cases were readily identifiable as prior court ordered four month 
evaluation and treatment periods at the FMC were clearly outlined in the forensic reports. 
For status reports, typically court ordered updates after every 30 days, the initial report 
was coded and the final status report provided data on restoration outcomes. Once all re-
admissions were excluded N = 201 cases were available for analysis. Importantly, not all 
data in the current study coded as ‘missing’ was absent, but rather absent only from the 
4241(d) report as evaluators would routinely reference separate reports. Access to this 
additional data was limited by the scope outlined in the BRRB research approval.  
 
 





Offense History. In addition to the previously outlined index offense data 
previous convictions and/or arrests and whether or not these past offenses were violent 
were also coded. Data were available on 154 cases regarding prior offending and for 122 
cases a determination could be made as to whether the offenses were violent or not. 
Designation of a violent criminal past was limited to interpersonal contact offenses 
involving aggressive acts. The overwhelming majority (79.2%) of defendants had a prior 
record of arrest and/or conviction and in close to half (48.8%) of these cases the previous 
offenses were of a violent nature. 
Time Spent in Custody. A myriad of factors, some more foreseeable than others 
(for example, the complexity of a case), add to time spent on pretrial proceedings. Data 
was screened for outliers9 in order to determine the average time defendants spent in 
custody prior to admission for CST restoration. The mean number of days defendants 
spent in custody preceding admission for competency restoration was 289.7 (SD = 189.8) 
days or approximately 9.5 months. When a defendant was charged while in a custodial 
setting the date of that specific instant offense was recorded as the date in custody. 
Arrests for violations of supervised release was recorded as date in custody, independent 
of the arrest date for the original index offense. 
Length of Stay/Admission (LOS). Upon conclusion of a court ordered 
competency restoration period defendants are transferred back to the referring district by 
US Marshalls. However, there are circumstances when a defendant may remain at the 
FMC, for example, by court order or instances where their continued psychiatric stability 
                                                 
9 Using outlier labeling (Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986) 




may be compromised by a return to a county jail or other contract facility. The mean 
length of stay (LOS) for a first study was 107.9 days (SD = 34) and there was no 
significant difference between the LOS means for those defendants ultimately found 
competent (M = 108.6, SD = 3.2) and those who were opined IST (M= 107.2, SD = 3.5) 
by clinical evaluators. 
 
CST Related Abilities 
 The forensic reports reviewed typically gave a brief course of the circumstances 
and related clinical forensic evaluations leading up to the current FMC admission, 
wherefrom impairments in CST abilities at the start of the competency restoration period 
were coded. There were data referencing impairment in competency related ability 
contained in the majority (92%, n = 185) of the reports/cases. However, most reports 
(57.8%) stipulated a broad Dusky-based statement regarding a defendant's IST status 
upon admission. In an additional 16.2% of cases a defendant’s ability to disclose relevant 
information to counsel was highlighted followed by problems with their relationship with 
counsel (5.9%), their ability to behave appropriately in court (4.9%), and their ability to 
appreciate the charges against them (4.9%). For those cases where the defendant’s 
relationship with counsel was mentioned “paranoia towards counsel” and “contempt for 
counsel” were some of the phrases noted. Examples of defendants’ inability to disclose 
relevant information were often mentioned in the context of a defendant’s disorganized 
speech and/or interpersonal withdrawal. A lack of appreciation of charges typically 
included references to a defendant’s insistence that they had not broken any law(s) 




regardless of their actual offense behavior/actions. All other frequencies for the 11 
psycholegal domains listed by Skeem et al. (1998) were ≤5.  
Given the limited number of cases across the 11 different domains no further 
analysis between groups was conducted for CST abilities. However, the two variables, 
ability to disclose relevant information to counsel and relationship with counsel were 
combined to form a composite variable, i.e., interaction with counsel (n = 41). Only 1 in 
every 3 cases where a defendant had a disrupted interaction with counsel was ultimately 
opined restored after four months. 
 
CLINICAL VARIABLES and DELUSIONS 
Previous Psychiatric Treatment. There was information on prior hospitalization 
and/or psychiatric treatment, excluding any custodial psychiatric treatment related to the 
current index offense, for n = 185 cases. Approximately a third of all defendants (66.5%) 
had a documented history of past psychiatric treatment. 
Comorbid Conditions. Forty five percent of defendants were diagnosed with 
either a post-study comorbid personality (n = 24), substance abuse/dependence (n = 63), 
and/or cognitive disorder10 (n = 13). The latter group comprised seven cases of mental 
retardation, four traumatic brain injury, and two cases of dementia. Most (70%) of the 
defendants suffering with cognitive disorders were found unfit to proceed and only 1 in 5 
was considered likely to be restorable by forensic evaluators.  
                                                 
10 Cases of mental retardation, cognitive impairment secondary to a medical condition or traumatic brain 
injury were grouped together. 




The majority of defendants (68.2%) with a comorbid substance abuse/dependence 
disorder had a history of abusing two or more substances. These were predominantly a 
combination of alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, and/or methamphetamines. Approximately 1 
in every 10 had a comorbid personality disorder and these included antisocial (n = 11), 
narcissistic (n = 4), and borderline (n = 3) personality disorders. Nine cases had a 
differential diagnosis of malingering or rule out thereof upon completion of the four 
month study, and two thirds of these cases were opined restored by forensic evaluators. 
  
Delusions and Clinical Subgroups 
The principle source of data for the symptom profiles gleaned from the BPRS 
were gathered from the initial clinical assessment of the defendant upon their arrival at 
the FMC. The course of the initial evaluation comprises a clinical interview by the 
primary forensic evaluator subsequent to the defendant's arrival at the Mental Health 
Department of the FMC and this is followed by the forensic team's assessment once the 
defendant is transferred to an appropriate unit. This clinical data often included dates of 
interviews alongside relevant incidents and observations. The coding of relevant BPRS 
data was limited to the mental status examination upon admission and these initial 
evaluations of the CST restoration period.  
A number of cases were excluded from subsequent analysis. Mental status data 
for two cases were not independently outlined at intake, but interspersed with the rest of 
the evaluation and treatment data, and were thus excluded from subsequent analysis. The 
aforementioned cognitive disorder and malingering (including rule outs) cases, and cases 
that did not reach the symptom cutoffs on the BPRS. The latter category included cases 




with minimal to no psychotic symptomatology as well as mood disturbances without 
psychotic features. 
Using BPRS cut scores a composite score for positive psychotic symptoms was 
calculated from the following items: somatic concerns, guilt, grandiosity, suspiciousness, 
unusual thought content, hallucinations, and conceptual disorganization. Based on this 
score the proportion of defendants who met the cutoff for positive psychotic symptoms in 
the sample was 79.6%. Overall, more than half (58%) of defendants experienced one or 
more subtype(s) of delusions. Persecutory delusions (64.3%) were by far the most 
prevalent delusional subtype followed by the grandiose (29.4%), somatic (5.4%), and one 
case of erotomanic delusions respectively. Of the defendants who met the symptoms 
threshold for psychosis 28.7% were classified as delusional, 38.9% schizophrenia 
spectrum, and 21.2% mood with psychotic symptoms respectively. Together these three 
groups comprised 70.1% (n = 141) of the entire sample. 
Dimensional Rating of Delusions. Results for the continuous action and 
pervasiveness variables showed that most offense behaviors for delusional defendants 
were unrelated to the index offense (44%). For those cases where delusions were 
connected to actions, i.e., the index offense, 22% involved aggressive acts without 
injuries to others followed by 19% of nonaggressive actions and 15% of aggressive 
actions resulting in injury and/or with the use of weapon. In terms of the pervasiveness of 
delusional ideation most defendants (46%) had numerous areas of their daily lives 
impacted as opposed to virtually all, not at all, or some areas of functioning. 
A comparison of delusions and their dimensional ratings across all three clinical 
subgroups is presented in Table 6. Approximately a third (30.9%) of defendants in the 




delusional subgroup had mixed delusions, and of these the predominant combination 
(83.3%) was persecutory with concurrent grandiose delusions. 
Table 6 
Prevalence (%) of Delusions and Dimensional Ratings across Clinical Groupsᵃ 
 Delusional  Schizophrenia  Mood with Psychosis 
Subtypeᵇ    
Persecutory 89.1 40.0 65.7 
Grandiose 39.1 26.6 20.0 
Somatic __ 6.6 11.4 
Dimensional Rating    
Actionᶜ 1.56 (1.06)* 1.00 (1.27) .44 (0.75)* 
Pervasivenessᶜ 2.07 (0.69)** 1.45 (0.81) 1.22 (0.89) 
ͣ Combined N = 141; ᵇ Proportion within group; ͨ Mean score (SD); p ≤ .05; p ≤ .005 
 
The dimensional rating of action (dependent variable) showed a statistically 
significant difference across the three groups, F(2, 101) = 9.44, p < .005. Post hoc Tukey 
HSD contrasts indicated that the index offenses (actions leading up to arrest, M = 1.56, 
SD = 1.06) of delusional defendants were more likely to be associated with their 
delusional ideation compared to defendants suffering a mood disorder with psychosis (M 
= 0.44, SD = 0.75), but not more likely when compared with defendants suffering 
schizophrenia spectrum symptoms. As a dependent variable pervasiveness showed a 
statistically significant difference across the three groups, F(2, 100) = 11.42, p < .005, 
indicating that delusional defendants ( M = 2.07, SD = 0.69) were more likely than the 




other two groups [schizophrenic spectrum (M = 1.45, SD = 0.81), and mood with 
psychosis, (M = 1.22, SD = 0.89)] to have a greater proportion of their daily lives 
impacted by delusional beliefs. Examples of the delusional content contributing to the 
higher scores on dimensional ratings for those in the delusional subgroup included cases 
of illegal re-entry compelled by the erroneous nonbizarre belief of being on a secret 
governmental mission, and a case where a defendant makes a border crossing without any 
effort to evade detection in the (false) hope of pursuing a love interest with a high ranking 
BOP official whom he met during a prior period of incarceration.  
Subgroups and Study Variables. Table 7 provides a comparison of the three 
groups in terms of key study variables. There were significant differences  for age and 
clinical group, F(2, 140) = 3.93, p ≤ 0.05, and for education and clinical group F(2, 105) 
= 20.58, p ≤ .005.Tukey HSD post hoc contrasts indicated that delusional defendants 
were older (M = 45.85, SD = 9.95) compared to those in the schizophrenia spectrum (M 
= 40.94, SD = 10.56) and mood with psychosis (M = 40.51, SD = 9.53) subgroups. In 
terms of education, those in the schizophrenia spectrum subgroup had completed fewer 
years of formal education (M = 7.74, SD = 3.22) than either of those in the other two 
subgroups. Both effect sizes for age and education were, however, very small (≤ .07).  
Further, analysis showed a statistically significant difference for ethnicity and 
clinical subgroup membership, χ2 (4, N = 134) = 3.55, p < .005. Defendants in the 
delusional subgroup were more likely to be Caucasian rather than African American or 
Hispanic. However, Caucasian ethnicity accounted for only a small part of group 






Mean Comparisons of Three Clinical Groups 
Group Delusional Schizophrenia Mood w/ Psychosis CI (upper, lower) 
Demographic      
Age 45.85(9.95)* 40.94 (10.56) 40.51 (9.53) 40.71, 44.12 
Education 11.54 (2.26) 7.74 (3.22)** 10.10 (2.19) 9.08, 10.27 
Ethnicityᵃᵇ     
African American 20.9 (9) 26.3 (15) 26.5 (9)  
Hispanic 16.3 (7) 49.1 (28) 35.3 (12)  
Caucasian 62.8 (27)** 24.6 (14) 38.2 (13)  
Legal Variables     
Custody to Admission 289.66 (208.67) 254.93 (155.57) 321.48 (183.75) 251.17, 313.54 
LOS 107.20 (33.09) 117.48 (30.95) 110.94 (30.57) 107.34, 117.81 
Prior Arrest/Convictionᵃ 28.9 (26) 43.3 (39) 27.8 (25)  
Treatment Refusalᵃ 89.1 (41)** 31.3 (26) 19.3 (16)  






Psychotropic Treatment. The FMC formulary for antipsychotic medications 
comprises a wide range of both atypical and first generation agents, including newer 
medications such olanzapine, ziprazsdone, risperidone, quetiapine, aripirazole, and older 
first-generation antipsychotics such as haloperidol, fluphenazine, and perphenazine (Dr. 
Bryon Herbel, personal communication, 2015). At least 59.2% (n = 119) of defendants 
started a trial of antipsychotic medication (not including those treated with 
antidepressants, mood stabilizers, and antianxiety medications only), and 47.8% (n = 96) 
had at least one adequate antipsychotic drug trial within the single study period. Most 
defendants, around two thirds (67.2%), were treated with newer, atypical agents and there 
was no statistically significant difference (p = .706) for competency status (opined CST 
or IST) and type of antipsychotic agent (typical vs. atypical) after a 4-month treatment 
period. 
Non-pharmacological Intervention. Data on CST group attendance or refusal 
was available for 116 cases and of these about 42% of defendants participated in the once 
weekly didactic group. The group is open-ended, runs on a seven week cycle, and 
includes an overview of the legal system, identifying and explaining the roles of court 
principals, the role of the defendant, working with counsel, basic legal vocabulary, and 
the trial process.  
Treatment Refusal. More than half (52%) of the defendants in the current sample 
refused treatment with antipsychotic medication at some point during their initial 120 day 
CST restoration admission. This group of treatment refusers included outright refusals 
upon admission as well as those who would intermittently refuse, but later voluntarily 




consent to treatment. Defendants have the right to and do refuse antipsychotic medication 
at any time during their competency restoration, and clinical presentations varied with 
corresponding periods of non-compliance and treatment refusal. Such disruptions in 
treatment did not necessarily prompt changes in the drug type administered, but were 
sometimes followed by renewed compliance and/or changes in the method of delivery. 
The majority of outright refusers were in the delusional subgroup (see Table 7).  
Treatment refusal showed a statistically significant difference across the three 
subgroups, χ2 (2, n = 143) = 27.044, p < .005. Delusional defendants refused treatment at 
some point during their 4-month CST restoration at higher rates compared to defendants 
in the schizophrenia spectrum and mood with psychosis subgroups. Only five of the 
forty-six DD defendants consented to treatment. Still, treatment refusal accounted for 
only a small part, phi (φ) = .189, of group membership. 
 
Involuntary Medication and Sell Requests.  
Prior to a request for involuntary treatment pursuant to Sell Due Process hearings 
under Harper, as required by the 5th United States Circuit Court, are conducted. Only 
seven (7) defendants were involuntarily medicated pursuant to Harper. These included 
instances where behavior stemming from treatment refusal or non-compliance with 
antipsychotic medication were a direct casual factor in the exacerbation of an existing 
medical condition; as well as cases where defendants exhibited persistent agitation 
rendering them a danger to themselves and/or those around them. 
Involuntary medication can of course be administered on an emergent basis under 
circumstances of acute distress or to manage medical conditions associated with 




substantial morbidity. However, when a defendant's mental illness does not preclude an 
ability to attend to his basic human needs of health and safety, i.e., falls short of the 
criteria for involuntary medication under the BOP administrative (Harper) guidelines 28 
CRF 549 Section 43(a)(5) and 43(b), as determined by a hearing officer, the treatment 
team will petition the court for judicial oversight to permit the involuntary administration 
of psychotropic medication (if of course there is a likelihood of restoration) under Sell. 
Forensic examiners submitted a total of 61 Sell requests for the 109 cases opined IST 
after an initial four month treatment period, and the greater proportion 52.4% (n = 32) of 
these was for defendants in the delusional subgroup compared to the schizophrenia 
spectrum (26.2%) and mood with psychosis (13.1%) subgroups. Further follow up of 
these Sell requests revealed that 36.1% (n = 22) petitions were granted and 11.5% (n = 7) 
were denied, and for the majority of cases (52.5%, n = 32) the petition was left 
unaddressed by the court.  Three cases in the latter category involved subsequent 
voluntary consent after the Sell submissions to the court while the rest (n = 29) were 
subsequently subject to an assessment of dangerousness pursuant to Title 18 USC §4246. 
 
CST Restoration Outcomes 
 The number of defendants opined fit to proceed after a single, statutorily 
determined four (4) month restoration period was 46% (n = 91). In one case the CST 
opinion was left undetermined and two (2) other cases involved evaluations of 
competency other than to proceed to trial, i.e., competency to be sentenced and 
competency to understand the conditions of supervised release. Tables 8 provides data on 
differences between those restored and those opined not restored. 




 Rates of competency restoration and the receipt of treatment were statistically 
significant, χ2 (1, n = 200) = 43.93, p < .005, phi (φ) = .469, showing that those treated 
with antipsychotic medication were much more likely to be opined restored at the end of 
the 4-month study. The proportion of defendants who underwent at least one 
therapeutically adequate trial of antipsychotic medication and were restored was 73.6% 
while the proportion of those not treated but restored was 26.4%. Comparably, 26.6% of 
defendants treated were found IST at the end of the 4-month study whereas 73.4% of 
those who went untreated were opined unfit to proceed. 
 
Likelihood of Restorability. Federal statutes (as with most state statutes) require 
that forensic evaluators proffer an opinion regarding the likelihood of CST restoration, 
i.e., the substantial probability that a defendant will attain the capacity to proceed to trial 
in the foreseeable future given a period of evaluation and treatment. Such cases included, 
for example, instances where defendants evidenced slow but steady symptom relief 
pointing to a substantial likelihood of restoration in the foreseeable future given ongoing 
treatment. Under these types of circumstance, absent outright treatment refusal, forensic 
evaluators petitioned the court for an additional four months of treatment under Section 
4241(d) of Title 18. For the vast majority of cases in the current study forensic evaluators 
opined that a defendant would likely be restored with ongoing and/or involuntary 
treatment. However, approximately 17% of defendants opined not restored after a single 
study were considered not likely to be restored by forensic examiners.  
 




Restored and Non-Restored Defendants. There were no significant differences 
between restored and non-restored defendants on any of the demographic variables of age 
and education (see Table 8). Length of stay in the FMC was also not significantly 
different for the two groups. One legal variables, time in custody prior to admission, 
revealed that pretrial detainees who spent a longer time in custody before admission for 
CST restoration were more likely to be opined restored at the end of their initial 120 day 
study,  t(180) = 2.722, p = .007. However, the variances between the two groups was 
significantly different from each other, p = 0.04 on Levene’s test, thus negating the 
results of the t-test.  
One clinical variable showed a statistically significant difference between restored 
and non-restored defendants, i.e., past psychiatric treatment and/or hospitalization, χ2 (1, 
n = 184) = 4.164, p = .041, phi (φ) = .150. Defendants who were opined restored after the 
120 day restoration period were less likely to have received past psychiatric treatment 
and/or hospitalization, precluding treatment related to the current index offense. Finally, 
the only other clinical variable approaching statistical significance at p ≤ .05 was 
comorbidity (p = .084) suggesting that those without a comorbid condition were more 
less likely to be opined restored. However, comorbidity was treated as a dichotomous 
variable and no individual diagnostic categories were examined in the subsequent 
analysis. 
Finally, most of the DD defendants were opined restored after the 120 day 
treatment period. However, the vast majority within this clinical subgroup refused 
treatment at some point during the course of their admission; consequently foregoing an 




adequate treatment trial. Notably, only five DD defendants  were voluntarily treated and 
of these three (60%) were restored within the statutory timeframe. 
The proportion of pretrial defendants within the schizophrenia and mood disorder 
with psychosis subgroups who did not refuse treatment and were restored after the 4-
month treatment period were 56% and 79% respectively. The preponderance of treatment 
refusal within the DD subgroup precludes any conclusions about the overall restorability  






















Study Variables and Competency Restoration Outcomes 
Variable Group CST % (n) IST % (n) p CI 
Demographic      
Ageͣ 41.05 (11.02) 43.40 (10.34) .12 -.64,5.32 
Ethnicity   .53  
African American 12.4 (23) 10.8 (20)   
Hispanic 16.1 (30) 21.5 (40)   
Caucasian 17.7 (33) 21.5 (40)   
Educationͣ 9.80 (3.17) 9.63 (3.38) .74 -1.24, .88 
Relationship Status   .27  
Unmarried 23.7 (36) 30.3 (46)   
Married 5.9 (9) 3.3 (5)   
Divorced 6.6 (10) 14.5 (22)   
Separated 7.2 (11) 6.6 (10)   
Legal Variables     




 108.60 (31.21) 107.21 (36.55) .77 -10.97, 8.19 
Prior Arrest/Conviction 78.3 (54) 79.8 (67) .82  
Violent Past Offense 51.8 (28) 46.3 (31) .54  
Clinical Variables     
Comorbid Disorder 51.6 (47) 39.4% (43) .08  
Prior Tx/Hosp. 73.3 (74) 59.0 (49) .04*  









Logistic regression analysis 
To assess CST restoration status after a single (primary) study period those 
variables that reached significance in the preceding analysis of mean differences across 
groups were entered into the logistic regression. In all four variables comprised the 
logistic regression. The demographic variables of age and ethnicity were entered into the 
model given their statistical significance in prior research (Mossman, 2007; Rodenhauser 
& Khamis, 1988). In addition, the one clinical variable, i.e., comorbidity that approached 
statistical significance in the preceding analysis was also retained as a predictor along 
with one static predictor, i.e., prior treatment and/or hospitalization. Taken together, the 
variables in the model were age, ethnicity, comorbidity, and previous psychiatric 
treatment and/or hospitalization. Given the significant number of DD defendants who 
refused treatment in the current study clinical group could not be meaningfully applied as 
a predictor of competency restoration outcomes. Also, the legal variables of offense type 
and past criminal history were not included given the equivocal findings about their 
contributory value in previous empirical studies. Neither of the latter two variables 
reached statistical significance  in this study.. 
Predictors were entered into the model in a single step and a test of the full model 
was statistically significant χ2(5, N = 172) = 10.802, p = .05 with a -2 Log Likelihood = 
226.80. The model had an overall successful classification of 63.4%, and was able to 
classify 50.0% of those that were restored correctly and 75.0% of those opined IST.  
Finally, an examination of the exponentiated values revealed that those 
defendants who had a history of past psychiatric treatment and/or hospitalization 
(excluding treatment while in custody for the current index offense) were more than 




twice as likely, 2.05 (CI 1.02, 4.11), p = .044, to be opined unfit to proceed after the end 
of the primary (120 day) study period. 





Logistic Regression Results for Competency Status after an Initial 120 Day Restoration Period¹ 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I. EXP(B) 
Predictor Lower Upper 
Age -.024 .015 2.36 1 .124 .977 .948 1.006 
Ethnicity²   1.587 2 .452    
Prior Psychiatric Treatment² .718 .3564 4.075 1 .044* 2.050 1.021 4.116 
Comorbidity -.383 .321 1.425 1 .233 .682 .363 1.279 
N = 172 (included in the analysis); Nagelkerke R = .081 
¹ Not Restored = 0; Restored = 1 
² Includes only African-American, Hispanic, and Caucasian 







 By some estimates, at any given time close to 10% of all the psychiatric beds 
across the entire United States are occupied by pretrial detainees referred for competency 
restoration (Mossman, 2007); a fact that should lend impetus for more research in this 
area. To date broader research on adjudicative competence has primarily focused on 
psychiatric diagnosis and psycholegal abilities after preliminary CST findings while data 
on CST restoration has been minimal. As a result existing knowledge about factors that 
predict successful restoration is not as robust as data on factors salient to initial 
competency status. The current study examined the restoration rates of delusional 
defendants after a single 4-months period of competency restoration and how this group 
of pretrial detainees compare to those with different psychotic symptoms. 
 
Prevalence of Delusional Ideation and Salient Demographic Variables 
Approximately 28% of the current sample had delusional ideation in the absence 
of other significant symptoms of psychopathology. However, it is important to stress that 
this number does not represent the prevalence of delusional disorder among defendants 
referred for CST restoration, but can be in  part considered an artifact of case selection.  
Notwithstanding, coding consistent with current nosological understanding 
(DSM-V, 2013) of delusional disorder suggests the inclusion of those cases with a single 
bizarre delusion, in the absence of hallucinations, disorganization, negative symptoms, 
affective disturbance, and psychomotor abnormality, would increase the overall number 
of cases in the DD group.  




Establishing sound prevalence rates for delusions is difficult, not only because 
populations differ (psychiatric vs. forensic), but also due to variability in the assessment 
methods across studies. Nonetheless, the presence of delusional thought content across 
the entire sample of defendants does indicate that their occurrence is by no means 
uncommon. The current study is not only consistent with previous research highlighting 
the preponderance of persecutory content in delusional ideation (Herbel & Stelmach, 
2007; Stompe et al., 1999), but also consistent with empirical studies showing the ratio 
between the two most common types of delusion, i.e., persecutory and grandiose 
delusions (Appelbaum, 1999). 
A comparison of group means across demographic variables yielded two notable 
results. First, DD defendants were older than those in the other two subgroups. This finding 
appears consistent with existing perspectives about patients with delusional disorder going 
undetected within the public health system for longer periods compared their counterparts 
who suffer with other psychotic disturbances. That is of course until they have a run-in 
with the criminal justice system (Felthous et al., 2001). 
The other result of note was the lower number of years spent in formal education 
by those defendants suffering with schizophrenia. Whereas the functional impairment 
associated with delusional disorder may be more circumscribed thereby resulting in less 
functional impairment within the community this results does suggest more pervasive 
dysfunction for those living with schizophrenia. Also, although this study did not 
investigate premorbid functioning meta-analytic data reporting prodromal cognitive 
deficits during adolescence for those subsequently diagnosed with schizophrenia has been 
documented (see for example Dickson, Laurens, Cullen, & Hodgins, 2012).   




Delusional Preoccupation and Offense Behavior  
As with prior research findings those defendants with persecutory ideation were 
more likely to have a stronger association between their delusions and pre-arrest 
behaviors. Previous studies have shown that persecutory delusions tend to have higher 
scores for action (as well as negative affect, a construct not investigated in this study), 
and this appears consistent with the present results given the predominance of delusional 
ideation for those in the DD group (Appelbaum et al., 1999). 
Defendants in the DD group had higher action scores suggesting a greater 
association between their pre-arrest behavior and their concomitant delusional thinking. 
Notably, the current study designated threats to harm and/or kill as aggressive behaviors 
regardless of whether defendants actually acted on such threats. Again, those in the DD 
group were overrepresented in this offense category.  
Previous studies have demonstrated that unlike schizophrenia and hallucinations 
on their own, delusions can have an independent association with violence (Swanson, 
Borum, Swartz, Monahan, 1996), and even more specifically, point to a link between 
persecutory delusions and violent conduct (Coid, Ullrich, Kallis, Keers, Barker et al., 
2013). Although the current findings do not speak to DD defendants’ propensity or 
motivation for violence the results do posit a link between aggressive offense behavior 
and delusional ideation. However, scholars in the area do point out that this relationship 
is complex and that delusions, along with underlying affective states such as anger, 
probably play a strong mediational role between violence and active psychosis (Coid et 
al., 2013; Junginger, 2006; Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001).  




DD defendants also scored higher on ratings of pervasiveness suggesting their 
delusional convictions extend into a greater number of areas in their daily lives, but not 
necessarily legal problems. In fact some scholars contend that these individuals only tend 
to  present for treatment after some confrontation with law enforcement (Felthous et al., 
2001), and the fact that the mean age of the DD group was older than both the 
schizophrenia spectrum and mood with psychosis subgroup is in line with such a view.  
Overall, the dimensional ratings of delusions yielded results in the expected 
directions. The delusional ideation of those in the DD group was more closely associated 
to their index offense and more prominent in their day to day lives compared with those 
in the schizophrenia spectrum and mood with psychosis group. 
 
Competency Related Abilities and DD Defendants 
Most competency related impairment upon admission were documented in some 
variant of Dusky. Even though there was not a sufficient amount of competency domains 
separately delineated to permit detailed analysis there were a number of cases 
documenting more specific psycholegal impairment. These cases were mostly in 
reference to a defendant’s ability to disclose information to counsel or to relate to 
counsel. The composite variable formed from the two preceding domains suggested that 
DD defendants were more likely to have a disturbed interaction with counsel. Numerous 
scholars have pointed out how delusional convictions are often a harbinger for 
impairments in decisional capacity, and how subsequent efforts to counsel and/or 
medicate are subsumed under entrenched delusional beliefs (Felthous et al., 2001; 
Golding, 1995). Delusional convictions may impact a defendant's reasoning and actions 




across a range of competency domains, however, the broad designations upon admission, 
of rational and factual understanding, and ability to relate to defense counsel as set out in 
Dusky, limited additional analysis CST domains.  
   
LOS and Treatment Refusal 
Time in Treatment. Length of stay for this study was defined as the first, 
uninterrupted 120 day competency restoration period. The fact that there was no 
significant difference between IST and CST defendants on this particular variable can be 
attributable to a number of factors. First, constraints on time and resources requires the 
process of competency restoration to be focused in order to maximize the likelihood of 
returning a defendant to court. Some studies suggests that most defendants are returned 
within six months and others in 90 days. The overall LOS, time from admission to CST 
restoration opinion, for the entire sample was not different for those opined restored 
compared to those found IST after 120 day study.  
There is no singular determinative factor in competency restoration, and 
unsurprisingly the complexity of the process suggests that forensic evaluators will tend to 
maximize treatment options and calibrate interventions accordingly. All this takes time. 
As a result the minimal difference in the LOS for those opined restored and those who 
remained IST after an initial 120 day restoration period is to be expected.  
As a variable LOS in the context of competency restoration is complicated, more 
especially for those defendants who are opined IST after a study. While in the custody of 
the AUSA these defendants are typically not remanded at the same facility once they 
conclude their statutorily determined 4-month treatment period. Even though there may 




be exceptions, for example when there are foreseeable risks associated with transporting 
an inmate back to a county jail, most defendants leave the FMC to potentially return later 
depending on their psychiatric wellbeing and pretrial proceedings. The extraneous 
confounds resulting from such transfers, e.g., continued psychiatric treatment or the 
disruption/lack thereof, outside the FMC complicates any interpretation of ‘time to 
restoration’. Also, the rates of treatment refusal for the current sample and how this 
behavior impacts time spent at the FMC cannot be discounted. 
Treatment Refusal. Treatment with psychotropic medication is the principal 
component in successful competency restoration, and not surprisingly, most defendants 
(approximately three quarters) who completed at least one full trial of antipsychotic 
medication were opined restored, regardless of the type (older vs. atypical) of 
antipsychotic agent administered. On the opposite end, refusal of such treatment is 
strongly associated with nonrestoration, albeit that a few scholars have reported some 
counterintuitive findings (Rodenhauser & Khamis, 1988). Consistent with the majority of 
existing studies treatment refusal showed a statistically significant association with IST 
findings by forensic evaluators. Given such high rates of treatment refusal and 
concomitant disruptions in the competency restoration process it is not surprising that 
forensic evaluators routinely recommend ongoing involuntary medication for the 
remainder of a defendant's pretrial and trial proceedings subsequent to a Sell request.  
In this study defendants gave a multitude of  reasons for medication refusal 
ranging from the overtly psychotic (“you want to neutralize my blood”), to sarcasm (“you 
restore furniture, not people”), to symptomatic denial (“ain’t shit wrong with me”), and to 
the seemingly rational (“I don’t like the way it makes me feel”). This study further 




demonstrates how complicated the competency restoration process can be since pretrial 
detainees who are psychotic retain the constitutional right to refuse forcible medication 
absent grave disability and/or dangerous behavior. 
 
Psychotic Symptoms and Competency Restoration Outcomes  
 Past research has been equivocal on the factors salient to competency restoration. 
The greater proportion of the defendants in this study were not restored within a single 4-
month treatment period, and the overall competency restoration rate in the current study 
was lower than that observed in previous research. A number of factors contribute to this 
finding. First, most defendants in the current sample were suffering with severe psychotic 
symptoms, and cases were selected on the basis of psychotic illness. In addition, the high 
rate of treatment refusal in the current study was strongly associated with findings of IST 
after a 120 day period of evaluation and treatment. However, the CST restoration rates 
for defendants who underwent at least one therapeutically adequate trial of antipsychotic 
medication was comparable with data reported in the extant literature, i.e., close to 75% 
of treated defendants are ultimately found fit to proceed. 
This study utilized BPRS symptoms to group defendants in terms of their 
psychosis profile and exam CST restoration rates thereby adding to the growing body of 
research focusing on symptom presentation rather diagnostic classification. The current 
research makes inroads into some of the nine domains identified by Skeem et al (1998), 
specifically, delusions, hallucinations, thought disorder, impaired reasoning, and mood 
impairment. Identifying these deficits in delusional defendants adds to existing 




knowledge about the treatability and restorability, albeit for a single initial restoration 
period, of this group of pretrial detainees.  
The  significant association between psychiatric drug administration and CST 
restoration has been well documented. Even though most DD defendants were opined 
unfit to proceed after the four month treatment period any  comparisons of clinical groups 
with regard to restoration outcomes is potentially confounding given the preponderance 
of outright refusers in the DD subgroup. The current data contributes to our 
understanding of how a delusional defendant without significant thought or mood 
disturbance engages with treatment in a clinical-forensic setting, but any comparison with 
other clinical subgroups in terms of CST restoration is restricted..  
 Unlike the current study the empirical investigations by Herbel and Stelmach 
(2007) and later by Cochrane et al. (2012) regarding delusional defendants and 
restorability both report data on involuntarily treated DD defendants. Both these studies 
reported comparable CST restoration outcomes of around 75% for pretrial defendants 
who underwent adequate (forcible) medication trials. In this study the number of cases in 
the DD group who were voluntarily treated and restored was rather small to warrant any 
meaningful comparison with the two other clinical groups. 
 Consistent with previous findings (Wolber, 2008; Mossman, 2007; Anderson & 
Hewitt, 2002; Rodenhauser & Khamis, 1998) a history of prior psychiatric treatment was 
associated with findings of incompetence. This could point to the severity and chronicty 
of psychotic illness in those defendants found IST. Although this study did not assess the 
chronicity of psychotic illness the presence of this static variable does appear to be 
inversely related to positive CST outcomes. 




As expected, DD defendants in the current sample also accounted for the bulk of 
the Sell requests submitted by evaluators. This study did not examine treatment outcomes 
subsequent to forcible medication. Consequently, the question of the restorability of DD 
defendants is not one that can be adequately answered by the current data. A number of 
factors determine whether or not a defendant who refuses treatment is medicated at some 
point during pretrial proceedings. For example, a seemingly more straightforward 
outcome is voluntary consent after initial refusal while at the other end of the spectrum a 
Sell request may be necessitated. Again, DD defendants outnumbered other pretrial 
detainees in terms Sell requests submitted to the court. 
Although most defendants in the current study were not restored within the first 
120 days of treatment more than 80% were opined restorable given ongoing or 
involuntary medication. Research suggest that forensic evaluators, consider factors 
associated with more favorable prognosis such as: a limited psychiatric history, good 
premorbid functioning, an absence of any comorbid disorders, and predominantly 
positive symptoms. Those cases where defendants were opined non-restorable included 
defendants who had at least three therapeutically adequate trials without clinically 
observable abatement in their psychiatric symptoms. Also, there were cases of defendants 
who became less combative after an adequate medication trial, but without much change 
in the intensity of their delusional ideation.  
The threshold for involuntary medication as per Harper is quite high, and this 
conclusion is in part borne out in the small number of defendants (7) medicated pursuant 
to Harper, even in the face of such high rates of treatment refusal. However, the 
significant conceptual disorganization and/or intense agitation characteristic of the 




behaviors of defendants who are medicated pursuant to Harper is inconsistent with a 
presentation of delusional disorder. 
 
Limitations and Strengths 
 The present study is subject to a number of confounds and limitations common to 
archival data reviews. First, the clinical data coded with the BPRS was from clinicians' 
evaluations of defendants. However, existing research has demonstrated a relatively good 
rate of agreement (up to 75%) between forensic examiners about the presence of different 
psychiatric symptoms (Skeem et al., 1998), and the current research distinctly focused on 
symptoms rather than psychiatric diagnosis. In addition, there is empirical data reporting 
the use of the BPRS in archival research with good attendant estimates of interrater 
reliability (Adachi et al., 2000; Mullins et al., 1986).  
Extensive data exists on the utilization of diagnostic categories and CST 
outcomes, and most studies point to the role of psychotic disorders and findings of IST. 
Zapf and Roesch (2011) have rightly argued that the oversimplification of the CST and 
overreliance on diagnostic categories limits more nuanced understanding. In an earlier 
work these same authors also point out that the base rate for competency restoration is 
high thereby according greater heuristic value to the identification of those cases with an 
equivocal or poor response to treatment (Zapf & Roesch, 2009). Unfortunately the high 
rates of treatment refusal by DD defendants in the current study limits any statistical 
comparison of CST restoration outcomes for different symptom profiles.  




Also, examiner opinions served as a proxy for CST outcomes, but as past research 
has documented, agreement between examiners and judges about CST status is 
sufficiently high (Skeem, 1998).  
 Thirdly, this study examined data from a single federal institution within the Fifth 
Circuit, and the expected variability in 4241 (d) referrals and resultant outcomes across 
different federal jurisdictions may thus further limit the generalizability of the current 
findings.  
The current study also has a number of strengths. First, it adds to the body of 
knowledge about a relatively understudied pretrial legal process. Given the resource 
intensive nature of competency restoration this study contributes to a more nuanced 
understanding of the restoration process thereby helping to focus treatment efforts in the 
context of variable symptom profiles.  
More specifically, the widespread prevalence of delusional content across 
psychotic disorders is well documented. Insight as to how delusions, independent of other 
psychotic symptoms, present in the psycholegal context holds potentially important data 
for treatment planning when presented with delusional ideation in the absence of any 
other significant psychotic or affective disturbances. CBT, albeit in studies with rather 
small samples, has been shown to attenuate the convictions and actions associated with 
delusional beliefs as well as reduce the affective intensity with which such beliefs are 
held (O’Connor, 2007). However, securing the willingness of a pretrial defendant to 
participate in such (alternative) treatment would no doubt be challenging. 
Finally, there is a paucity of data on treatment refusal rates for IST defendants 
undergoing restoration. This study provided data on a number of factors that have been 




hitherto overlooked in the extant literature. Data from the current research suggests that 
these rates can be quite high, especially for defendants suffering with delusional ideation. 
Such treatment refusal included determined, outright rejection of antipsychotic 
medication upon admission as well as subsequent refusal once a course of treatment had 
been initiated. On the one hand these findings yield the anticipated results, i.e., a 
decreased probability of restoration for those left untreated with antipsychotic 
medication, but on the other hand they also open a window of insight into the type of 
pretrial detainee likely to refuse treatment.  
  
Future Directions 
 As the body of research on competency restoration expands attention can turn 
even more closely to salient outcome variables. When the constitutional right of a 
defendant to refuse intrusive forcible medication is overridden the underlying processes 
driving such decisions require close investigation. The work by Herbal and Stelmach 
(2007) and Cochrane et al. (2012) provides valuable insight about the restorability of 
delusional pretrial defendants. One implication from the rates of treatment refusal in the 
current study means these results are not a direct extension of the aforementioned 
authors’ work. Therefore, future studies can examine the data on Sell requests for 
delusional defendants using larger sample sizes, and moreover, the circumstances 
resulting in the denial or granting of Sell require more rigorous investigation, including 
those cases when Sell requests are altogether deferred by the court and ‘superseded’ by an 
order for custodial examination of dangerousness under Title 18 USC §4246.  




In addition, the role of possible mediators in treatment responses requires closer 
scrutiny. To start, data on treatment refusal among pretrial detainees is sparse, and to 
regard refusal by delusional pretrial detainees as mere recalcitrance, likening them to 
their counterparts in the community, is somewhat simplistic. The extent to which their 
false beliefs are related to an index offense, concomitant anger, and whether they suffer 
mixed (more than one subtype) delusional ideas could all potentially mediate responses to 
treatment in the forensic setting.   
Later research, using actual adjudicated competence after a period of restoration, 
needs to continue building on available data regarding the efficacy of different 
antipsychotic drugs, particularly for delusional defendants who undergo adequate, 
presumably involuntary (given high rates of symptomatic treatment refusal) medication 
trials.  
Although no single study could cover the breadth of variables (and limit all 
confounds) associated with CST restoration future research would do well to track 
pretrial detainees who refuse treatment more comprehensively. This in turn would require 
IRB approval commensurate with the scope of such an undertaking.  
 As more standardized CST restoration protocols are developed across 
jurisdictions treatment can be matched more accurately to specific symptoms. Shifting a 
defendant’s psycholegal state to where they can return to court in a reasonable time to 
confront their legal predicament is central to the process of competency restoration. Facts 
pertinent to each case for DD defendants will continue to determine respective outcomes, 
however, as our understanding about the efficacy of treatments for this group evolves 
those elements less relevant to successful outcomes should fall by the wayside. 





 Consistent with previous empirical findings the single variable identified in the 
current study to be most predictive of non-restoration was a history of prior psychiatric 
treatment and/or hospitalization. The current study and future research can help address 
the relative dearth of data for both CST restoration and the impact of delusional ideation 
within the forensic context. Alongside advances in psychotropic treatments restoration 
outcome studies can offer a more coherent and comprehensive data profile to the courts. 
The body of research on competency restoration will no doubt continue to grow and 





















1. Study Case #: ______________ 
2. Age at time of admission to FMC: ______________ 
3. Race/Ethnicity: ______________________________ 
4. Current  employment: Yes/No / Employment by history ______________ 
5. Education (yrs.)._______/Relationship status:_______  
6. Prior Conviction: Yes/No  Violent/Non-V. 
7. Original index offense (adapted from Cochrane et al., 2012): 
1=Murder/Attempted Murder    
2=Sex Offense   
3=Assault    
4=Firearm(s)    




9=Other: (specify) ______________________________ 
8. Date first in custody for current charge:  _____________________ 








10. Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS)  
Symptom N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Somatic concern N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Somatic delusion 
2. Anxiety N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Depression N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Suicidality N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.  Guilt N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Guilt N/A Bizarre Nonbizarre 
6. Hostility N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Elated mood N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Grandiosity N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Grandiosity 
N/A Bizarre Nonbizarre 
N/A Grandiose Erotomanic Mixed/Other 
9. Suspiciousness N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Suspiciousness 
N/A Bizarre Nonbizarre 
N/A Persecutory Jealous Mixed/Other 
10. Unusual thought content N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. Hallucinations N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. Bizarre behavior N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. Self-neglect N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. Disorientation N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Conceptual disorganization N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. Blunted affect N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
17. Emotional withdrawal N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
18. Motor retardation N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
19. Tension N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
20. Uncooperativeness  N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
21. Excitement N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
22. Distractibility N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
23. Motor hyperactivity N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
24. Mannerisms and posturing N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




11. Reason for initial CST evaluation: 
1=disruptive, bizarre behavior 
2= indicators of MI while in custody and/or documented history of MI 
3=suicidal behavior or history of such behavior 
4=uncooperative with counsel 
5=bizarreness of offense 
6=appears unkempt 
 7=not specified (N/S) 
12. Competency related ability impaired: (impaired) 
0=Capacity to participate in trial: (Yes/No) 
1= Capacity to testify relevantly: (Yes/No) 
2=Capacity to understand the adversary nature of proceedings: (Yes/No) 
3=Capacity to disclose relevant information to counsel: (Yes/No) 
4=Basic knowledge of legal strategies and options: (Yes/No) 
5=Relationship with counsel: (Yes/No) 
6=Capacity for reasoned choice among options: (Yes/No) 
7=Capacity to behave appropriately in court: (Yes/No) 
8= Capacity to appreciate charges: (Yes/No) 
9= Capacity to appreciate potential penalties: (Yes/No) 
10=Medication effects on CST: (Yes/No) 
11=Other (specify): _________________________________________________ 
 




13. Previous psychiatric hospitalizations and/or treatment: (Yes/No) 
_______________ 
14. Comorbid psychiatric disorders (after 120 days/first study): 
 0=None 
 1=Cognitive disorder 
 2=Substance use disorder: [specify type(s)] ______________________________ 
 3=Personality Disorder: (specify by name) ______________________________ 
 4=Other disorder:(specify by name): ______________________________ 







16. Dimensional rating of delusions: 
16.1 Action: 
0=unrelated to index offense 
1=non-aggressive actions 
2=aggressive acts without injury to the victims 
3=aggressive acts with injury or use of weapon(s). 
 16.2 Pervasiveness: 
  0=not at all 1=some 2=numerous 3=virtually all 




17. Hallucinations: (yes/no) ________   
18. Type (e.g., auditory, tactile): _______________________ 
19. Antipsychotic medication(s): (yes/no) ______    
 19.1 Trial 1 - Specify name: __________________________________________ 
 If discontinued specify if: N/C_____ Refusal_____ Side-effects_____ 
 19.2 Trial 2 - Specify name: __________________________________________ 
 If discontinued specify if: N/C_____ Refusal_____ Side-effects_____ 
 19.3 Trial 3 - Specify name: __________________________________________ 
 If discontinued specify if: N/C_____ Refusal_____ Side-effects_____ 
 19.4 More than 3 - Specify name(s): ____________________________________ 
20. Other psychiatric medication(s): (specify name) ___________________________ 
21. No. of psychotropic medication trials to restoration: ________________________ 
22. Participation in any non-pharmacological intervention: (yes/no) ______ 
    Specify type if available: __________________ 
23. Treatment refusal: (yes/no) ________ 
24. Sell authority requested:  Yes      No (Granted/Not Granted) ________________ 
 24.1 If not granted, list reason: ________________________________________ 
25. Was subject/defendant transferred from FMC after 1st study?  Yes No 
26. Date of CST opinion after first study:__________________________________ 









§ 4241. Determination of Mental Competency to Stand Trial to undergo Postrelease 
Proceedings 
 (a) Motion To Determine Competency of Defendant.—At any time after the 
commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the 
defendant, or at any time after the commencement of probation or supervised release and 
prior to the completion of the sentence, the defendant or the attorney for the Government 
may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. 
The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there 
is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a 
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is 
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to 
assist properly in his defense. 
 (b) Psychiatric or Psychological Examination and Report.—Prior to the date of 
the hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the 
defendant be conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the 
court, pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c). 
 (c) Hearing.—the hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 
4247(d). 
 (d) Determination and Disposition.—If, after the hearing, the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental 
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist 




properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the 
Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a 
suitable facility— 
  (1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is  
  necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the 
  foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to  
  go forward; and 
  (2) for an additional reasonable period of time until— 
  (A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if  
   the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within  
   such additional period of time he  will attain the capacity to permit  
   the proceedings to go forward; or 
  (B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to  
   law; 
  whichever is earlier. 
If, at the end of the time period specified, it is determined that the defendant's mental 
condition has not so improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant 
is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and 4248. 
 (e) Discharge.—When the director of the facility in which a defendant is 
hospitalized pursuant to subsection (d) determines that the defendant has recovered to 
such an extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense, he shall promptly file a 
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. The 




clerk shall send a copy of the certificate to the defendant's counsel and to the attorney for 
the Government. The court shall hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions of 
section 4247(d), to determine the competency of the defendant. If, after the hearing, the 
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has recovered to such 
an extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings 
against him and to assist properly in his defense, the court shall order his immediate 
discharge from the facility in which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for trial or 
other proceedings. Upon discharge, the defendant is subject to the provisions of chapters 
207 and 227. 
 (f) Admissibility of Finding of Competency.—A finding by the court that the 
defendant is mentally competent to stand trial shall not prejudice the defendant in raising 
the issue of his insanity as a defense to the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as 
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